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WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

A STAND FOR LIBERTY

by VERNON BARTLETT

AN opponent in the Bridgwater by-election misquoted me, and declared that I had accused Mr. Chamberlain of going to Munich "like a dog with his tail between his legs." "I say" this opponent continued, "that he went like a British bulldog." "Next time," shouted a farm labourer from the back of the village hall, "why doan't 'ee send a retriever, so 'ee bring us back summat?"

The Prime Minister has himself confessed his disappointment that his policy of "appeasement" has met with such poor results. All his compatriots will share his regret, but not perhaps his astonishment. For one of the few hopeful features about the world situation to-day is the obvious desire of the German people to keep out of war and that desire was not to be encouraged by complete British submission to Herr Hitler because he thumped his fist on the table. It happens to be the fact that within the last few weeks more generals, burgomasters and other responsible Germans have been dismissed or arrested, but the Hitler government, if ever it is to be persuaded to modify its methods, will only do so if it has reason to fear the hatred of the mass rather than of a few disgruntled officers or officials.

Within a few days the Prime Minister will presumably be trying to win over Signor Mussolini to the dull and staid life of the old and satiated democracies. He will fail as he failed with Herr Hitler. The best that could be hoped for from this policy of flattery is that it postponed war while our preparations were rushed ahead; it is, alas, naïve folly to imagine that the present rulers of Germany or Italy are going to change their morals and methods to please an earnest old gentleman with an umbrella. If we are to prevent war—and pray God we still may—it will only be by taking risks and measures such as the timid occupants of the Treasury Bench are never likely to contemplate.

The Visit to Rome

The danger of the Rome visit lies in this. The Prime Minister cannot return empty-handed, and there is no earthly reason to suppose that the Duce will make him a present which will enhance his waning prestige and enable him to win a general election. He may give some assurance that he is "appeased," some vague promise that he will do his best to keep the Führer quiet, but only in return for fresh concessions. Mussolini's puppets shout about Tunis, Corsica and Nice less because he would like those territories than because he would like to frighten Daladier and Bonnet (who, in the words of a brilliant Frenchman, "has a positively erotic passion for treachery") into further surrender. And the victim this time is to be Spain.

The German press has been attacking Great Britain and the Italian press has been attacking France only because Hitler and Mussolini are determined to gain control of the Iberian Peninsula.

Nobody can doubt Mr. Chamberlain's sincerity in his pursuit of peace. But nobody has yet received an adequate explanation of these facts—that on his three journeys to Germany he was unaccompanied by the Foreign Secretary, the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government, the Permanent Under-Secretary who deals with European affairs, or an official from the Foreign Office News Department; that he resisted all requests for a summoning of Parliament until the irrevocable surrender of Czechoslovakia had been decided upon; that he accused the Leader of the Opposition, when he criticised the Munich agreement, of "fouling his own nest" and reminded him that that sort of thing would be forbidden in the totalitarian states. It would be kinder to attribute this hostility to the normal controls that should be exercised by democratic

public opinion to the nervous strain to which he has been subjected, but one dare not pass it over like that, for a similar stubborn refusal to give information is apparent where the Rome visit is concerned, and Spain matters more to the British Empire than did Czechoslovakia.

Forget all you have read about Spain and look at a map of British trade routes. A glance at it will show why we spent so much money on propaganda during the last war to prevent the Spaniards from sympathising with Germany to the extent of allowing German submarines to find a base along the Spanish coast. And a moment's thought will convince you that to that preoccupation is now added the still greater danger of German air bases in Spain or in the Spanish colonies on the west coast of Africa. Every trade route between this country and Central America, South America, Africa, the Mediterranean states, India, Australia and the Far East would be threatened, and that leaves very few!. No enemy of Britain, we should surely all agree, must ever control Spain.

But the aeroplanes that bomb British food ships in Barcelona or Valencia are Italian or German. The armed trawlers that have held up British ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar with no intention of

"Nebelspalter"

Switzerland

AS IT WAS IN 1923—CARTOONS FROM THE TIME OF THE RUHR INVASION

Poincaré: "Now the German people must admit that Right rules the world!"

Poincaré-Salome asks for the head of the German Michael-Jochanaan.

calling at any Spanish port are Italian or German. The foreign troops that are being kept on by General Franco after all the foreigners on the Spanish government side have been withdrawn under strict international supervision—those foreign troops are Italian or German. The British sailors who have been killed while carrying on lawful trade with Spanish ports—and if they were trading for profit, since when have capitalists found that so reprehensible a motive?—were killed by bombs manufactured in Italy or Germany, dropped from Italian or German aeroplanes which, in roughly four cases out of five, were piloted by Italian or German flying officers. The two governments that have the best reasons to desire the weakening of the British Empire are the two that are now in control of all that Spanish territory nominally ruled by General Franco —the Atlantic coast, the Canary Islands and the North-West coast of Africa, from which our trade routes to America and round the Cape could be threatened; Majorca, a menace to France's communications with her African Empire; Spanish Morocco, Algeçiras, Cadiz and Malaga, which convert Gibraltar into an expensive geographical anomaly and destroy our hold over the Mediterranean; the Basque country and the Pyrenees, which give France, our inevitable ally, another frontier to defend and from which German aeroplanes could more easily bomb the West of England than they could from Germany.

The Objective

"I have no programme. I have only objectives and goals. All the rest is tactics," Herr Hitler once said to one of the world's most experienced journalists, Karl von Wiegand, who writes of the Munich crisis that the Führer "went to the ninety-nine and nine-tenths point near war without any thought of ever going the other tenth." And as long as the threat of war can be used as an instrument of national policy, that tactic will obviously be followed. Therefore one will be pleasantly surprised if the Rome visit passes off without Italian threats to attack France unless some very important concession can be dragged out of M. Daladier by Mr. Chamberlain. Whether the Führer on that occasion backs up Mussolini or pretends to be the mediator is merely a matter of tactics. The objective will still be the weakening of the democratic system in Great Britain and France.

It is even possible that for some months Herr Hitler will be so busy fomenting Ukrainian trouble for the Poles and the Russians and intimida-

ting the Lithuanians or the Rumanians that he will have no time to help Signor Mussolini to win concessions from France in Tunis or Jibuti or on the Suez Canal Board. The strength of British feeling against the grant of rights to General Franco to starve his compatriots into submission to Rome and Berlin may induce the Prime Minister to refuse to use Spain as Czechoslovakia was used, and in that case the Führer will doubtless put his demand into cold storage until a more suitable moment arrives. But the goal, the objective, will remain the same.

We in Great Britain have our responsibilities for the present situation. A strong line against M. Poincaré's announcement that he was going to occupy the Ruhr, for example, would have prevented that major disaster, the German inflation. On half-a-dozen occasions an ounce of conciliation and confidence would have checked that bitterness out of which grew the Hitler movement. But even the Prime Minister himself must now realise that his policy of concessions are considered all the world over as admissions of timidity and weakness. The immediate risks of a change of policy are obviously much greater than they were even six months ago, but without that change there must be war and there may be defeat.

It may be that our democratic forms of government and our ideas of individual liberty are destined to disappear. If they are, the fault will be ours rather than Hitler's or Mussolini's, for they have given us ample warning. There is, about the present policy of the British Government, nothing at all to inspire. Ideals are not to be confused with mumbled phrases about liberty and democracy which are designed only to distract attention from our distressed areas, our profiteering on armaments and food, our laziness in face of the worst crisis this country has known for more than a century.

No Longer The Worst of Evils

But there are still some of us who take our democracy, our freedom of speech, our conception of justice, sufficiently seriously to be prepared to fight for them. Some of us who will not believe that the British have no further contribution to make to civilisation. Some of us who consider easy consciences of more importance than easy chairs and who are so revolted by the prevalence of bullying and cruelty that the possibility of war—although we have struggled unceasingly since 1918 to abolish that scourge—no longer seems the worst of all evils. Some of us! How many?

That is the question to which we must so anxiously await the answer. Mr. Chamberlain believes we are few in number; otherwise he would not be so ready to thrust all normal conceptions of international law and justice into the background. I believe that we are very many and that the emergence of a leader would be followed by such a national revival that none would dare threaten us and that, freed from threats, the nations of the world could once more get down to negotiation.

Meanwhile there is comfort in the fact that we have been through much of this before. I could not do better than end this article with some verses written by Alfred, Lord Tennyson, in 1852. Only France, and not Germany, then threatened.

"My Lords, we heard you speak: you told us all
That England's honest censure went too far;
That our free press should cease to brawl,
Not sting the fiery Frenchman into war.
It was our ancient privilege, my Lords,
To fling whate'er we felt, not fearing, into words.

"We love not this French God, the Child of Hell,
Wild War, who breaks the converse of the wise;
But though we love kind peace so well,
We dare not even by silence sanction lies.
It might be safe our censures to withdraw;
And yet, my Lords, not well: there is a higher law.

"As long as we remain we must speak free,
Tho' all the storm of Europe on us break;
No little German state are we,
But the one voice in Europe: we must speak;
That if to-night our greatness were struck dead,
There might be left some record of the things we said.

. . . . . .

"We feel, at least, that silence here were sin,
Not ours the fault if we have feeble hosts—
If easy patrons of their kin
Have left the last free race with naked coasts!
They knew the precious things they had to guard:
For us, we will not spare the tyrant one hard word."

THE URGE

Whatever hostile critics may say, we are convinced that our motives in the creation of our Empire were not greed of gold or love of power, but a sub-conscious urge to civilise, that only became conscious under the enlightening pen of Rudyard Kipling. *Lord Esher, "Fortnightly Review."*



'Marianne' *Paris*

"Help! They're on strike too!"

"L'Oeuvre'

"Seven milliard new taxes!"
"And we haven't even shot an Embassy official."

RELICS

"If only they could have little ones!"

FOREIGN BALANCES

by DOUGLAS REED

"Spotlight," whose notes have been followed with intense interest by "World Review" readers, is now incarnated as Mr. Douglas Reed, the well-known newspaper correspondent, whose book, "Insanity Fair," immediately placed him in the forefront of current commentators and prophets. Published last April, it is still selling, the publishers state, at the rate of two thousand a week. The same qualities of pungent forcefulness with deep knowledge and clear judgment that make his book outstanding are here in these notes

HAIL, in the contemporary phrase, 1939! 1938 was a bad year for those who dislike to have their tranquillity disturbed; Austria, Spain, China and Czecho-Slovakia were distant but irritating noises, like the maid breaking a tea-cup downstairs. But 1938, in retrospect, will one day look calm and placid compared with 1939. The fat, as a great philosopher once said, is in the fire, and 1939 will sizzle.

For my part, I took leave of 1938 with a merry Christmas in Prague and seem likely, as I write, to contemplate the oncoming happy year of 1939 from a Ruthenian mountain top.

That Christmas was merry. Old Prague, with its harlequinade-like strings of sausages in the windows, with its flagons of good and gleaming liquor, with its ancient alleys and turrets and towers and gables, offers the ideal background for a Christmastide festival; sprinkle a little tinsel on it for the snow, put lights in the windows, and you have the prettiest Christmas picture in Europe. Not even the German cities can compete; the Bohemian capital is a Christmas Carol come to life.

In 1938 it was as gay as ever. The same people who, just three months earlier, wept and shouted in these streets now jostled through them as parcel-behung shoppers, the shop windows were gleaming, Aladdin-like caves of good things. Somewhere, in outer darkness, were 100,000 Czech and German refugees, huddling in damp huts and sheds, their children ailing, unseen, by the world forgotten, facing a hopeless future. In the towns and cities the picture was a bright and warming one of Christmastide good cheer.

MR. DOUGLAS REED

The Czechs, this Christmas, were granted their peace on earth, at the price of goodwill towards Germany. They did not wish for this; they were coerced, and now they enjoyed their Christmas as best they might, no longer as freemen, but once more, after a break of nineteen years, as bondmen. Enclosed by German frontiers on three sides, the gap on the fourth side is being closed by that sovereign German road across their territory, and then they are in the cage, with the door shut.

Next Christmas not even their shops will be so gay or so well-filled. The things that come from abroad will not be there, because since Munich their currency has slumped, on the clandestine market, from 140 to 300 to the £1, so that they cannot buy again when existing stocks are exhausted. The things they grow themselves, those good geese and turkeys and chickens, the best *Wurstwaren,* sausages of all kinds, in the world, the renowned Prague ham, the excellent Slovak liquors? Germany, where fats and foodstuffs are short, is already pressing the Czechs for a Customs Union or something very near akin to it. Their powers of resistance are now weak, and if Germany gets her way Czecho-Slovakia will be relegated to the rank of grocer and poultry dealer to the Reich, her own domestic standard of living will sink.

Prague, at this merry Christmastide of 1938, gave the answer to the question that the innocents abroad so often asked: "Surely Hitler will be satisfied when he has all his Germans? Just give him his Germans and all will be well; surely he won't go and overrun foreign races and lands?"

The Czechs are the first in the cage. In 1939 others will enter it.

The number of its inhabitants will rapidly increase. In it they may have relative peace as long as they do what they are told, in peace as in war, in politics and in economics. Theirs to produce food or other things she needs for the Reich in peace; to bear arms for her, at the most, or to dig reserve trenches for her, at the least, in war.

So Hail 1939!

The New Guard

In Prague the new men have come. Dr. Emil Hacha, completely unknown to the masses, has gone up the hill behind the red-breeched dragoons to sit in Eduard Benesh's chair. Rudolf Beran, corpulent, bald, Benesh's old enemy, the peasant politician come to the Prime Ministership, has publicly proclaimed Germany's ascendancy in Europe and Czecho-Slovakia's submission to her; his, as the agrarian leader, to see that the farmers produce for Germany and get good prices. Franz Chvalkovsky, erstwhile Czechoslovak Minister at the three corners of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle, is Foreign Minister; he "implored and warned and protested" against the Benesh policy of implicit reliance on France and England, and was universally regarded as a certainty for the Presidency, when something—they say, a spectral grandmother—intervened.

Consider another man who has emerged from the back-stage crowd to the coveted circle of the spotlight: a fiercely-moustachioed Slovak Fascist with a lowering glance, Czecho-Slovak Vice-Premier Sidor. Athletes, when they are training for a race, sometimes have a man before them called a pace-maker, who runs faster than they do. This is M. Sidor's position in relation to the Central Government in Prague. The Czechs have been pushed on to the steep slope of anti-democracy, but did not go willingly and now wish to move as slowly as they may and to save their strength. M. Sidor wants to go all out.

He dislikes Czechs, Jews, Jewish Bolshevism, Red Spain, Jewish Geneva. He habitually wears Hlinka Guard (Slovak Storm Troop) uniform, even in Prague, "so" he says "that I may not be mistaken for the top-hatted and tail-coated gentlemen there." Prague is not going fast enough for him; it has not formally denounced the Soviet Treaty, there is, or until recently was, a Masaryk Brigade in Spain, and so on. M. Sidor has opened one or two concentration camps in Slovakia; the large German minority wears its Nazi uniforms and collaborates closely

with the Slovak Storm Troops, which in practice means that Germany's word is almost law. Many people believe that strategic reasons alone prevented Hitler from taking the Slovak capital, Bratislava, just down the Danube from Vienna; that he preferred for the present to leave it a nominally Slovak city with a large German population and virtually under German control.

New Year Anticipations

So much for the picture that a backward glance at 1938 gives you.

But approaching 1939! What ferment in all Eastern and Danubian Europe, in Poland, Memel, Rumania, Hungary—everywhere. Everywhere the little fish are scurrying about in terror of that dragnet called The German Peace, the Pax Germanica.

Everybody believes that Hungary, Memel, the Polish Corridor and possibly the Polish Ukraine will come into the cage in 1939.

Consider another man who has come into the spotlight—Andor Jaross, "Führer" of the million Hungarians who returned to Mother Hungary from Czecho-Slovakia at the order of Germany and Italy, Minister without Portfolio for Upper Hungary, head of sixteen deputies from the "liberated" areas in the Budapest Parliament.

Andor Jaross is another Sidor!

In Insanity Fair you sometimes find amusing sideshows, and this matter of the "liberated Hungarian territory" is one of them. The riddle you have to answer is, who was liberated, or who is to be liberated, the people in the liberated areas by Budapest, or Budapest by the people from the liberated areas?

In Trianon Hungary peasants pine to own their land, workers yearn for civilised living conditions. The country, since Bela Kun's Bolshevists were chased out by the Rumanians, has for twenty years been ruled by Regent Nicholas Horthy, who twice had to chase out the claimant to the throne he guards, and successive Tory Governments which have sought to distract the thoughts of the peasants from their landless plight and of the workers from their slums by concentrating all publicity and policy on "frontier revision."

After twenty years, the regime has had its first success: M. Jaross, his 15 deputies, his million Hungarians, his Upper Hungary, all returned to the fold. A enormous success for the Regime in Budapest? Not in the least.

Andor Jaross, in Czecho-Slovakia, was the ally of Hitler's Henlein against the Czechs. He is in feeling National Socialist through and through. His first act in Budapest was to refuse to be called "Excellency" —a bombshell that shook Budapest to its foundations. In Czecho-Slovakia the peasants owned their land; in Hungary they did not. Jaross called for land for the peasants, for decent conditions for the workers; he was not the friend of the Regime, but its enemy, the ally of the Hungarian National Socialists, of the German minority in Hungary. He spoke of "a breath of fresh air"—from "liberated" Upper Hungary; of "new blood"—from "liberated" Upper Hungary. He proved to be the Trojan Horse. In Czecho-Slovakia the Czechs had in 20 years spent vast sums on improving the lot of the masses. Jaross had seen this and liked it. The Regime in Hungary, the classic land of reaction, detested it.

The Ferment Works in Hungary

After the Saar and the Rhineland, Austria. After Austria, Czecho-Slovakia. After Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Memel. Here in Hungary you see the process at work. The Jews are wealthier and more powerful in Hungary than in almost any European country east of the Rhine. They took a leading part in the clamour for the return of the oppressed Hungarians to the motherland, for the dismemberment of that Czecho-Slovakia which, until it was beaten to its knees, had given every Jewish refugee from Germany and Austria unquestioning asylum.

The shape of things to come in Hungary is already discernible. German domination; anti-Semitism; improved conditions for workers and peasants. Immediately after the triumph, one of the chief artisans of that back-firing weapon, Foreign Minister Coloman de Kánya, resigned. Czech-hater-in-chief, unless the Regent outdoes him. Of racial origins difficult to ascertain. The spirit of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office incarnate, from the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, when the stories about mutilated Austrian Consuls and bestial Serbs were spread. Wily and wary, lip-clamped, brown-skinned, silver-haired. A product of the pre-war Ballhausplatz, a figure symbolic of reaction. His chief assistant, little Count Stefan Csaky, succeeds him: 44 years old, a former Austro-Hungarian naval officer, bristle-moustached, Kipps-like. Is he a stop-gap, or is he the man Germany trusts? That is not yet clear.

Then Poland. Poland is also *an der Reihe* now that Czecho-Slovakia has been dismembered, and Poland has her little bit; Poland's turn is

COMMENT FROM HOLLAND

Doewe 'Haagsche Post.''

CIANO THE VENTRILOQUIST

THE POGROM

"You're wrecking our own shop!"

Doewe, "Haagsche Post."

coming. Czecho-Slovakia was dismembered in the name of "self-determination." Poland has her large Ukrainian minority (Russia has a larger, Carpathian-Russia a small section of the Ukrainian family) that clamours for "self-determination." The demands for home-rule—Henlein's "eight point programme" for the Sudeten Germans—have been tabled in the Warsaw Parliament. Germany controls little Carpathian-Russia—which she calls Carpatho-Ukraine; it is the tiny tongue of land reaching eastward from Slovakia, the platform from which Germany can operate. Will Russia intervene on Poland's behalf if Germany sets the whole gigantic machine in motion to liberate those Ukrainians, to make out of them, as out of the Czechs and Slovaks and Hungarians, hewers of wood, drawers of water, and possibly bearers of arms for the Reich? If she does, war is there. Good judges do not think she will. They believe Poland, probably in 1939, will have to hand over that corridor to Germany, give home-rule to those Ukrainians—who may find themselves enclosed within a German "motor-corridor."

Mystery of the Iron Guard

Rumania, the promised land of oil and wheat! The great goal! There, a few days after King Carol had seen Hitler, the anti-Jewish leader, the friend of Germany, Corneliu Codreanu, was shot, with a dozen or more of his chief lieutenants. The plots and intrigues behind such political murders reach across many frontiers, and the light of day hardly ever reaches into the furthermost corners; read Stephen Graham's book about the murder of Alexander in Marseilles, and consider the extraordinary lack of precautions by the authorities of that city, if you wish to understand this. Who had Codreanu shot? Is it conceivable that the King had it done, a few days after seeing Hitler? Did somebody else, in Rumania, have it done, quickly, without the King's knowledge, in order to put the fat in the fire? We shall not know for long enough, perhaps we shall never know. But watch Rumania.

While the zone of the Pax Germanica spreads steadily and relentlessly eastward, the manœuvres, the shadow-boxing, the sparring and feinting and side-stepping of the Great Powers make men giddy. One thing is clear. The Rome-Berlin partnership is as strong as ever; the Paris-London association is at present hopelessly outfought. During Ribbentrop's visit to Paris the co-ordination of German and Italian policy was masterly. The tactics are so far superior that they must have success.

As soon as Ribbentrop was on his way, the Italian campaign against France began. It was bound to make the French statesmen more accommodating to their German visitor, more yielding to the German wishes. Germany then played her part: advice to the French to make peace with Italy. "But" says Germany, "You can't expect anything for nothing. We have made a treaty with you because the Czecho-Slovak problem is solved; Italy will make a treaty with you, but you must first solve her problem, that of Tunis and Corsica."

France gets her treaty, the recognition of the Franco-German frontiers as immutable. Poland has, since 1934, a similar treaty. Watch those Polish frontiers in 1939.

Meanwhile, the wedge between France and England is hammered in. I have never seen so prolonged or venomous a campaign as that which the official German Press is daily conducting against England at this moment. The copy of the official Nazi *Völkischer Beobachter* which I have before me at this moment tells its readers that "in Palestine since 1936 more than 18,000 Arab prisoners have been killed, over 16,000 of them by British soldiers."

Your Press tells you little about this daily campaign. You are reaping the fruits of Munich.

Watch Spain

And Spain? Spain, where Franco has said that after victory he will take reprisals on two million people, Spain of which Mussolini has said he is resolved that Franco shall win.

I should advise you to watch Spain too, because you are still told that the whole basis of your foreign policy is friendship with France, and if Franco wins France will have German air-bases on her southern frontier, the only land from where she hitherto had nothing to fear, and Italian air-bases in the Balearics will intercept the French sea-routes to her colonies, where are her reservoirs of native troops, and German guns will permanently cover the Straits of Gibraltar, which your Navy has to pass to enter the Mediterranean.

So you might think that it would be bad for your ally France and for yourself if Franco were to win. Apparently not. I fancy we may soon be told that if Germany and Italy are only given this one more, positively last, final satisfaction all will be well and we shall live happily ever after.

But how can Franco win, as Spain seems to be against him and not

all his Moors and Germans and Italians have as yet enabled him to conquer his countrymen? One method, as he thinks, would be for the parents of Non-Intervention, England and France, to grant him belligerent rights. This would enable him to starve out his opponents, whereas at present, as *The Times* says, the refusal of belligerent rights "bars the ordinary humane method of sea-warfare."

Humane Starvation?

The Times, incidentally, a few days earlier reported a speech by the Archbishop of York in which he said that England was largely to blame for events in Germany because of her inhumane blockade of Germany.

Is it bad to starve Germans but good to starve Spaniards, small people far away whom we know nothing about?

The point is interesting, because I think we may soon find a movement in favour of granting Franco that right to starve out his adversaries. I may be wrong, but signs point in that direction.

I remember that in the autumn of 1937 *The Times,* which is an independent organ, threw out a cautious suggestion that the union of Austria with Germany might be desirable. This was completely contrary

"Le Canard Enchaîné"

"What we need, you see is a democratico-fascist régime, with a kind of Republican Führer. . . ."



"Marianne," Paris

"I would like to know your opinion on. . . ."
"The 40-hour week?"
"No, the Queen of England's crinoline."

to the proclaimed official policy of the British Government, which was to uphold the integrity and independence of Austria, and the article was repudiated in Whitehall. In March, Austria was annexed and the British Government deplored. Then, again, I remember that on September 7th, 1938, *The Times* threw out a cautious suggestion that the Sudeten-German areas might be ceded by Czecho-Slovakia to Germany. This was completely contrary to the proclaimed official policy of the British Government, which was to uphold the integrity and independence of Czechoslovakia, and the article was officially and with acerbity repudiated on September 8th. On September 19th, a Franco-British ultimatum for the surrender of this territory was presented to the Czecho-Slovak Government.

Now we come to Spain. On December 7th, 1938, *The Times,* in a leading article and another supporting article, threw out the cautious suggestion that Franco might be accorded belligerent rights and thus enabled to starve out his opponents. The last sentence was: "Certainly there would be the less excuse for the continuance of methods of warfare condemned by British opinion if it should ever become possible to substitute those which it approves." This seems to mean that British opinion would approve "the ordinary humane methods of sea warfare"—the starve-out with British connivance—but does not approve of a stand-up fight if Franco doesn't win.

I am now waiting to see what happens about Spain, whether that cautious sugestion of December 7th again foretells what will happen a little later.

I hope you will have a happy New Year. I know you will have a lively one.

THOSE WEDDING BELLS

The Bishop of Stuhlweissenburg, in agreement with the Cardinal-Prince-Archbishop of Hungary, has forbidden that the Wedding March from Wagner's 'Lohengrin' or Mendelssohn's 'Midsummer Night's Dream' music, or any part of these operas, should be played at weddings.

The reason given is that the Wedding March in 'Lohengrin' is the prelude to a murder and the cooling of conjugal relations. In 'Midsummer Night's Dream' the bridegroom is transformed, on the stage, into an ass.

"Tactful enlightenment by the clergy," adds the Bishop's order, "will divert Catholics from the tasteless fashion of having themselves married to the accompaniment of such music."—*"Prager Tagblatt."*

THE OPEN FORUM

THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE
A Proposal for the Conference

by H. ST. J. PHILBY

In this section we publish, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles from men of international fame. This month we have two contributions on the problem of Palestine, giving the points of view of two experts on the subject. Mr. Philby, famous explorer of Arabia, friend of King Ibn Sa'ud and his people, makes a concrete, if drastic, proposal which is bound to command attention. Professor Norman Bentwich, M.C., O.B.E., who explains the moderate Jewish standpoint, was Attorney-General of Palestine from 1923 *to* 1931; *Professor of International Law of Peace at Jerusalem Hebrew University; and High Commissioner for Refugees for Germany from* 1933 *to* 1936. *He is the author of a number of works on Palestine*

IS it peace? I asked myself in the old Welsh formula, as I tuned in at Riyadh to hear the promised summary of the Woodhead Commission's report and the statement of H.M. Government's policy for the immediate future of Palestine. During the afternoon the British Minister at Jidda, Sir Reader Bullard, had arrived at the Wahhabi capital to communicate these two documents to the King in advance of actual publication simultaneously in England and Palestine.

The announcement of the summarised statements, conclusions and recommendations of the Commission's report produced in my mind a crescendo of despair—already discounted in advance, as for many months now it has scarcely seemed likely to me that the Commission could possibly produce any recommendations that would materially help the Government in its thankless task. Yet it was with considerable relief and some surprise that I heard that the Government had a surprise packet in store for everybody. Instead of pronouncing a definite policy on Jewish immigration, it proposed to convene a round-table conference to discuss

the Palestine problem over the whole of its range. To that conference the Jewish Agency, the Palestine Arabs and the *neighbouring Arab States* were to be invited to send delegates to confer with His Majesty's Government. This idea (of bringing in the Arab States) had of course been mooted before and even predicted in optimistic Arab circles quite recently, but it came as a surprise to me—a very welcome surprise.



MR. H. ST. JOHN PHILBY

This step should have been taken more than a year ago as a consequence of the Peel Commission's report. I had strongly urged it in conversation with a responsible Colonial Office official in October, 1937, and in other ways. Yet within the last few months it was asked in *The Times* who had given the neighbouring Arab States the right of concerning themselves with the affairs of Palestine. The answer to that question is very simple: God Almighty. The Arab States had exactly the same right, though not backed by anything like the same might, to interest themselves in the fate of the Palestine Arabs as Herr Hitler had to concern himself with the welfare of the Sudeten Germans. It is a great advance, therefore, that the British Government has now specifically conceded, or recognised, this right. That is a profoundly satisfactory feature of its most

recent pronouncement on Palestine affairs. It has already produced a satisfactory reaction, tempered only by a little disappointment, at the announcement that the Government reserved the right to exclude from the conference any Palestinian Arab who is definitely *persona non grata.*

In this connection Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's further elucidation of the conference proposal in a Parliamentary statement on November 10th, the day after the publication of the report, has tended to displace the White Paper itself in the limelight. The Arab States to be invited to the Conference are Egypt, 'Iraq, Sa'udi Arabia, Yaman and Trans-Jordan. None of them could have been omitted, but it is a matter of real regret that Syria and the Lebanon are excluded on purely technical grounds. It is surely scarcely to be believed that the French Government, as Mandatory, would object to their inclusion. They are both more vitally concerned in an ultimate Palestinian settlement than any of the States mentioned except Trans-Jordan. Their exclusion is an error. They should be invited. If there are technical objections, they should be got over.

The Mufti's Exclusion is Unjust

But more important by far than this matter is the proposed restriction on the free representation of the Palestine Arabs. The Mufti is specifically debarred from the Conference for reasons that do not sound convincing. I know of no crime that has been charged or proved against him. If the Government is better informed, it should publish the facts in justification of its decision. He is of course the enemy. That is freely admitted, and he is doubtless proud of the fact. In the eyes of the Palestine (and other) Arabs the present rebellion is a struggle for their rights. We have declared our desire to negotiate a settlement without further fighting. In doing so we presumably assume the possibility of a settlement. But no settlement is possible if we demand the right of determining the enemy's representatives at the Peace Conference. That is elementary. And let it be repeated that no crime has been brought home to the Mufti, apart from the fact that he is the acknowledged leader of the rebels who are quite convinced that they are fighting in a just cause for their lives, their rights and their religion.

But let us even suppose that the Mufti could be proved guilty of actually firing shots that resulted in the deaths of British officials. Would that justify his exclusion from the peace conference? Let the British

Government study its precedents. Has it so soon forgotten 'Iraq? Forgotten who fired the first shots (actually resulting in British deaths) in the 'Iraq rebellion? Forgotten who was condemned to death (naturally *in absentia*) by a military court for his share in Tall 'Afar? If so, let me remind it that the first shots for 'Iraqi independence in that rebellion were fired—by the present Prime Minister of independent 'Iraq. Let me also remind the British Government that the father of the present Foreign Minister of the 'Iraq Government, who recently visited London and was fêted everywhere as a *persona gratissima,* was one of the principal leaders and fomenters of that rebellion and that he, like the Mufti to-day, took refuge in a neutral country as soon as his own became too hot for him, but nevertheless took a prominent part in the subsequent peace proceedings.

If the British Government, therefore, wants the Conference to be successful or wants an armistice in Palestine during its consultations, the ban on the Mufti should be removed. If Palestine wants to be represented by him, Jamal Husaini, Ahmad Hilmi and other leaders, it should be left free to nominate them. They won't bring any bombs with them to London, and it is just as well that the British Government and people should hear what they have to say about the past and the future.

Assuming that these serious flaws in an otherwise admirable proposal are rectified, we may pass to the prospects of the Conference itself. It appears from Mr. MacDonald's statement that the Conference is not, after all, to be a round-table one. It is to consist of two tête-à-tête talks between Mr. MacDonald and the Jews on one hand and between Mr. MacDonald and the Arabs on the other. No very serious objection can be urged against this, though a tripartite conference at a round-table would be better. At the worst the tête-à-tête meetings, which have already been tried *ad nauseam,* are unnecessary, not fatal. They may register final failure but only a full meeting can register success.

Alterations to the Mandate

Turning now to the agenda, Mr. MacDonald has made it clear that the proposed discussions will be allowed a very wide measure of latitude. It is specifically stated that all parties will be free to propose alterations of the Mandate. Does this concession—a very valuable one—envisage the possibility of the Mandate's being altered out of existence, e.g. by an agreed scheme of partition or an agreement to create a Palestinian State

in treaty relations with Great Britain on the 'Iraq model? Presumably such contingencies as these are envisaged—and, at any rate, any declaration to the contrary by the British Government would kill the Conference unborn. So the parties will not be unduly restricted in the range of their discussions.

Nevertheless there is one possibility which has probably not been envisaged and might even be regarded by some as shocking. Will it be within the competence of the negotiating parties to challenge the juridical basis of the Mandate? This is a most important and vital matter. Everybody knows that the Jews and the Arabs base their respective claims on certain promises made to them by Great Britain and—in the Jewish case—actually enshrined in the Mandate. But does the British public realise that, while both sets of promises have been interpreted and argued about in the most conflicting manner during the past twenty years, no attempt has ever yet been made to test the legal validity of either set? The documents containing them are admitted; the dates of those documents are not in dispute; the parties affected by or concerned in them are known. Yet two of the parties concerned strenuously contest the interpretation put upon the earlier set of promises by the third party. And the third party asserts that the later promises, being in conflict with the earlier ones as interpreted by itself, are legally invalid. Such a conflict of opinion suggests that the matter should be capable of easy resolution under the ordinary processes of the law. A competent international court exists at The Hague for the determining of just such disputes as these. Will it be within the competence of any of the parties to the dispute to demand its submission to that court on the understanding that the court's decision will be accepted by all parties as final?

If so, there is hope that a controversy which has troubled three great peoples for nearly a generation may be set at rest for ever. If the verdict in unfavourable to the Arabs they can only blame their representatives of twenty-five years ago for incompetence as negotiators. If, on the other hand, the Balfour Declaration is condemned as invalid in international law, both England and Jewry will know that they have perpetrated a grievous wrong on the Arabs and should not hesitate to make honourable amends. It is not unlikely that the Arabs may demand a judicial examination of the very bases of the dispute. And, if they demand that, it cannot be refused—but it is just as well that we should know beforehand what we are letting ourselves in for by the initiation of the proposed conference.

The time has arrived for drastic treatment of a grievous malady, the only alternative to which does not bear contemplation. As Herr Hitler remarked recently, British policy in Palestine "smells very much of violence and very little of democracy." We must guard ourselves against the repetition of such a taunt, and we can do that only in one way—by practising the justice which we preach as an ideal.

For years past the British Government and the British public have had the representatives of world Jewry at their elbows and in their midst to help them in the task of laying the foundations of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The two parties have not always been in full agreement as to policy, but they have always been in the closest communication and consultation. That is very important. For years past the opinions of the Arab world have been ignored. The right of the Arab world to intervene in the matter has been challenged and denied. So far as the official opinion of the Arab world has been expressed to the British Government, it has been expressed behind the closed doors of diplomatic

IN PALESTINE

"What is democracy, Achmed?" "When we both have the same handcuffs."

"Kladderadatsch" Berlin

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convention. The British public has been kept in complete ignorance of the official reactions of the Arab world to British policy in Palestine, except once when the Arab kings intervened with the approval of the British Government to secure a fair field for the operations of the Peel Commission. Now, after nearly a generation of deliberate exclusion, the Arab world is admitted to the council-chamber on equal terms with the other parties to the long controversy. Now is its great opportunity. It will shew that lack of practice has not dulled its capacity for negotiation. The Arabs will shew themselves to be hard bargainers. But they will demand nothing but justice.

Prospects of the War

So much for the coming conference. Let there be no mistake about it. It will decide whether the future of Palestine is to be determined on the basis of justice or by the arbitrament of the sword. The Arabs quite definitely do not want to fight against the British but they will fight if they are forced to it in defence of what they regard, rightly I think, as their rights. And such a fight will not be as hopeless as some might think. The reputation of Lawrence rests largely on the fact that he understood the value of Arab guerilla tactics against better organised military systems. Palestine during the past year has emphasised the lessons he learned during the War and tried to teach. Some interesting statistics were recently published by the British Government regarding the operations of the three months of August, September and October. It was claimed that 400 "bandits" had been killed by the British forces during that period, and it was admitted that 29 British, 144 Jews and 230 Arabs had been killed by the rebels. The Commission's report states that there were 316 fatal casualties among British, Jew and the Arab population from January to July, but the rebel casualties (doubtless many fewer) are not given. These are very interesting figures which, taken with the fact that there are 20,000 British troops in the country while the rebel organisation probably does not exceed 5,000 men-at-arms at any given time, suggests that the Government is not having things all its own way.

It is not an exaggeration to say that, man for man, the contending parties are pretty equally matched, while the Government has the advantage of aerial bombing and the rebels balance that with the advantage of the terrain and the widespread sympathy of the whole Arab population. In view of these conclusions no one but a born fire-eater can desire

the continuance of the war, and the Government has been wise not to insist on the stoppage of the rebellion as a condition precedent of the proposed negotiations. The war can only be ended by the doing of justice.

It will be seen that I have all but ignored the Commission's report. It certainly merits close examination but that can be left to the leisure of a future day. Its main conclusion, the impractibility of partition, has been adopted by the Government with greater precision than the Commission has shewn in suggesting it. The rest of the matters dealt with in the report do not therefore arise. They will provide plenty of material for the officials of the Colonial Office to study, and it is sufficient perhaps to emphasise here the frequency with which the Commission abandons half-explored avenues of solution on the ground that they are barred by the certainty or probability of Arab opposition. The Commission has laboured nobly in extremely disheartening circumstances, and it is not the fault of its members that they have not been able to find a way out of the wood. And, *pace* the Commission, I would assert that, *on the basis of our existing Mandate obligations, the only possible solution of the problem is that proposed by the Royal Commission, namely partition!* It has, however, been made quite clear that that would mean war with the Arabs. So it is no good going on in that direction. What is the alternative? There is one. And that is to go right back to the beginning, to the very root of the trouble—the Mandate itself—and to uproot it. Our statesmen are, however, probably incapable of such a big thing. They will stick to their botching and patching up a threadbare garment. And all I can suggest to them in that case is that they will be drowned if they do not stop the leak in their boat. Stop immigration and the dangerous influx of the Jewish flood. They can then think out what to do with the water already in the hold.

After the first flush of pleasurable surprise, criticism is already beginning to take the place of indulgence. This is due to some features of the Government decision already sufficiently discussed above, and in some Arab circles there is already talk of boycotting the Conference. That would be a great mistake. But I must make it clear, in conclusion, that the views expressed in this article are mine and mine alone. I have naturally heard the matter discussed on all hands, but it must be understood that His Majesty the King of Sa'udi Arabia and his Government are debarred from expressing any opinion on the new proposals by the fact that they have been invited to take part in the Conference.

ARAB-JEWISH CO-OPERATION?
Benefits of Settlement

by NORMAN BENTWICH

TWENTY years have passed since the Armistice, and since a British Administration was established in Palestine. In that period the Holy Land has been utterly transformed. A derelict province of the Ottoman Empire has been turned into one of the most progressive of countries. Its population has doubled from 700,000 to 1,400,000. Its productive capacity has been multiplied many times over, both in agriculture and in industrial output. The export of citrus fruit, its principal product, has risen from a million cases to 12,000,000 cases. Its foreign trade has manifested the same extraordinary expansion, the value of the imports rising from £3,000,000 to £17,000,000, of the exports from £1,000,000 to £4,500,000. During that period the population of Jerusalem has risen from 60,000 to 120,000, of Haifa from 25,000 to 100,000; while Tel Aviv, which in 1918 was a garden-suburb with some 2,000 inhabitants, has now over 150,000 Jewish citizens.

The progress has not been by any means exclusively of the Jewish population. The Arabs have increased in mere numbers from 600,000 to 950,000; and their increase, mainly by natural fertility, is equal to, if not greater than, the increase of the Jews, mainly by immigration from all parts of the world. They have risen, too, beyond all estimate in the standards of material life, in conditions of health and in national consciousness. An all-embracing cultural life has been established in the country. Its University of Jerusalem, its music, its literature, its architecture and its art, the creations of the Jewish minority of 400,000, have attracted the attention of the world. They are equal to the cultural achievements of the oldest and most civilised countries of the west. The Jew returning to his National Home has brought with him the best of European thought. He has established there and realised in full measure the most advanced ideas of social organisation. He has revived his ancestral language as a vehicle of literature and thought, and has stimulated at the same time the revival of Arabic. The work of the Jewish people during the twenty years, as the Colonial Secretary recently remarked in the House of Commons, has been a wonderful achievement of creation.

Till the spring of 1936, Palestine was judged to be amongst the countries which had shown outstanding economic development and intellectual progress since the War. But during the last two years it has suffered materially and politically a setback. It has been a centre of strife and civil warfare that, with a short lull, has been getting ever more embittered and ruthless. Bands of terrorists have preyed upon all elements of the population, Arab, Jewish and English. The casualties in the last few months have numbered over 2,000 Arabs, 1,000 Jews and 200 English. What is, perhaps, the gravest feature in the organised anarchy is that the Arabs reputed to be moderate are the most numerous of the victims. Partly spontaneous, the rising has been fomented and aggravated, for all the harm that they could, by maliciously interested Powers outside. Palestine at the eastern end of the Mediteranean, like Spain at the western end, has become a pivot of the international conflict. It is the diseased condition of Europe which, more than anything else, has been responsible for this longdrawn "sub-war" in the Holy Land.

The Blunder of Partition

It is apparent now to the British Government, what was apparent a year and a half ago to many concerned with the destiny of Palestine, that the proposal for partition of the country into three states, an Arab, a Jewish and a Mandated State, was a blunder. The short-cut led to a cul-de-sac. What was proposed as a means to peace was, in fact, a provocation to more violent hostility. A part, indeed, of the Jewish population in Palestine, and a majority of the Zionist Congress, were persuaded in the summer of 1937, immediately after the British Government adopted the proposals of the Royal Commission for partition, that an equitable division of the country was the best solution of the troubles. The Jews, they believed, could have their full freedom of development in one-fourth part of the Promised Land west of Jordan, and would be able therein to build up, more rapidly and more effectively than under a British Mandate, a growing community which would have the dignity of a sovereign state. The Arabs, they believed, given their complete self-government and sovereignty in the greater part of Palestine west of the Jordan, as in the whole of the country east of the Jordan, and free to link up their destiny with the Arab sovereignties to the north, the south and the east, would be content and would enter into friendly relations with their Jewish neighbour. The British, permanently established in the

Holy City of Jerusalem, and in a corridor from the City to the coast at Jaffa, and assured of special prerogatives in the port of Palestine, Haifa, which has become one of the principal harbours of the Eastern Mediterranean, would be able to secure at once the Imperial communications to the East and peace between Jews and Arabs. It was an alluring vista, seized upon all too rapidly by the British Government; but it was an illusion, like a mirage of the desert.

The Government which at the beginning of this year had already, as it seems, conceived some doubts about the virtue of the policy of partition, sent out in the spring to Palestine a second Commission to report on the technical aspects of a precise scheme of division. The Commission examined the problem for three months, and after three months more cogitation, reported. Its judgment was adverse, though it clung in varying degrees of diffidence to the principle of division.

Co-operation the Goal

The statement of policy of His Majesty's Government, which was made by the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, last month in the House of Commons, may give a new start to the political history of Palestine in our times. Not partition, but perseverance, is now the maxim of government policy. And it is perseverance to bring about understanding and co-operation between Jews and Arabs. In that way only can the present deadlock be resolved; and until it is resolved, the British Government must rule and take firm control. It is no less clear that, to bring about understanding, Arabs and Jews must be prepared to make concessions to each other from their full demands for the respective National Homes. The Arabs, or rather some Arab representatives at a recent Congress in Cairo, which was glorified by the title of an inter-parliamentary congress, demanded the complete abandonment of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, complete prohibition of Jewish immigration and further settlement on the land, and the recognition of Palestine as an Arab State. The Jewish leaders, while declaring that they have no desire for political domination, and will accept parity with the Arabs, have claimed the right of Jewish immigration up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, which principle might lead to a Jewish majority within a measurable term of years.

The most difficult issue is that of immigration and a middle way must be sought. At a moment when the Jewish people are driven and perse-

cuted as they have not been since the darkest period of the Middle Ages, Palestine has seemed to be a heaven-sent haven in which tens of thousands of those rendered homeless would find a home and opportunity. Palestine has, in fact, absorbed since 1933 a larger number of German Jews—as many as 45,000—than any other single country. Recently the Jewish Agency have put forward a programme for absorbing immediately in the National Home 100,000 refugees. Yet it seems necessary to sever the problem of the refugees from the policy of Palestine, if a basis of peace is to be found. An immigration of 100,000 in a year would provoke the frenzied hostility of the Arabs. Mr. Winston Churchill, the author of the phrase "economic absorptive capacity," stated in a debate in the House of Commons that he did not mean by it to exclude other factors in determining immigration. Political and psychological considerations must have their place. On the other hand, the Arab leaders must recognise that the Jews who have a right to enter the country, are in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance to the extent to which they can be absorbed without drastically changing the position of the two peoples.

Hopes For the Conference

The Arabs to-day have a majority of half a million in a population of less than 1,500,000. It would be possible for them to retain a substantial majority, and at the same time to allow for a Jewish immigration which would give a possibility of maintaining the steady growth of the home and feed the stream of creative life. An Arab party has established itself in Palestine to oppose the extreme attitude and the murderous methods of the Mufti of Jerusalem and the terrorists; and that gives hope that there will be amongst the Palestinian Arabs a response to the British Government's effort for conciliation. The resolution of the Government also to consult with the Arab leaders outside Palestine, King Ibn Sa'ud and the Ministers of Egypt and Iraq, who are more responsible and have a more statesmanlike vision than the Arab politicians of Palestine, strengthens the hope that the Round Table Conference between Arabs and Jews may be realised.

It is possible that at the present moment no broad basis of understanding may be found. The passions may still be too hot, and the outside Powers that are exploiting the troubles in the Eastern Mediterranean may do all they can to stoke them up. If, unhappily, the British Government is rebuffed in its attempt, it must carry on the administration as

before, but with this new resolution, to seek every possible means to bring the two peoples together. It must persevere in its policy of appeasement in Palestine as in its policy of appeasement in Europe. The success of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in bringing about an agreement between Eire and England, in spite of the legacy of bitter feelings from the past, is of good omen for the similar attainment of his goal in Palestine. Perseverance is his motto, and it is also his method. He may have to wait on opportunity till there is an understanding that Palestine was, is, and will be, not a national State of one people, but a bi-national country in which two peoples must co-operate for their mutual good. In 1921 Mr. Winston Churchill observed to the protesting Arabs in Jerusalem that there was room for the two peoples in the land which they both loved; and if they worked together, they would be prosperous and happy. That remains true. And it remains the key to the solution of the Palestine problem. The Jews will be prepared to make their contribution for peace. The Arabs, too, wearied of internecine feud and relieved from the fear of the Jewish State, may realise that their wellbeing and the progress of the whole Arab domain will be furthered by Jewish settlement and Jewish co-operation with them not only in Palestine, but in the whole Arab region.

UNDIGNIFIED

For the "This England" section of the *New Statesman and Nation* (assuming this also applies to the English in their colonies), I suggest the following extract from the report of the Singapore traffic committee: "It has been represented to us that some members of the motoring public *may experience a sense of dignity* if required to leave their motor-cars in a park and walk to their offices." (My italics.) The committee gravely comments as follows: "We do not consider that there is any substantial basis for such an anticipation."—*Anak Singapura, "Straits Budget," Singapore.*

CURIOUS

It is a curious fact that the hunting-field can show more individuals who have done or are doing something definitely worth while than are to be found in any other community gathered together for purposes of relaxation. A hunting holiday is the finest Winter Sport of all. It need not be the most expensive.—Consult Captain ——. *Advt., "The Times."*

NOT HALF

A pacific Note has been exchanged by France and Germany. Some find it vague. But a vague declaration of peace is better than a clear declaration of war.—*"Le Canard Enchaîné," Paris.*

MUSSOLINI AND TUNIS
The Fascist Technique

by GEORGE MARTELLI (Author of *Whose Sea?*)

AFTER the Anschluss it was predicted by several shrewd observers that Italy thenceforth would pursue her star, no longer along the treacherous channels of the Danube, but across the clear and sunny waters of the Mediterranean. This prophesy has been fulfilled. The tendency of the Italian dynamism to turn away from Central Europe and to proceed in an Imperial and African direction, which was noticeable early last year, became still more marked towards its end. If anything was needed to convince Italy that there was no room for her own expansion on the continent beside Germany's, it was provided by the fate of Czechoslovakia. Even so, Mussolini appeared reluctant to accept the verdict. In a final trial of strength with his partner in the Axis he backed the Hungarian claim to the whole of Ruthenia. The result of the test was quite clear. Hungary did not get her common frontier with Poland, Ciano having gracefully given way to Ribbentrop. In Europe there was evidently nothing doing for Italy. A few weeks later came the spontaneous demand for Tunis, Corsica, and Nice.

With Corsica and Nice we need not be concerned. One can scarcely suppose that Italy has serious designs on those places. Tunis is another matter. Readers of *World Review* who are conversant with recent books on the Mediterranean must be familiar by now with the history of the problem. It may be useful, however, to say something of present conditions in the Protectorate.

When I visited Tunis earlier this year I found the same kind of situation as existed in the Sudetenland for a few months prior to the Hitler ultimatum. There was the same intensive propaganda, the same feverish activity on the part of a small number of individuals, the same exploitation of grievances, some real and some imaginary, all tending to produce an artificial tension. The technique is too well known to need describing in detail. Invented by the Fascists and perfected by Dr. Goebbels, it is employed with equal success by Italy, Germany, or Japan whenever one or all of them are contemplating a new aggression.

Among the mass of the Italians, I did not find much genuine excitement. I believe the attitude of the average colonist was that of my Italian

femme de chambre. When I asked her what she thought of the agitation, "the trouble in Tunis," she replied, "is that there's too much politics. We Italians are quite happy with the French. All we want to do is work."

Most of the Italians had been born in the Protectorate, many of them belonged to families which had been settled there for two or more generations. They had no stronger feelings about nationality than the Italians in the United States or South America, before Fascism came along to make them race-conscious. They would have been quite willing to adopt French citizenship, thereby acquiring complete equality of status, if their own authorities had allowed it.

The majority of them are either agriculturists settled on small holdings and working their own land, or employees in the more or less skilled trades, such as masons, engineers, and waiters. Most of these people are as well off working under French protection as they would be doing the same job in Italy.

Measures of Self-Defence

There are also a large number of Italian manual labourers who compete with the natives in the lowest-paid market. A common Italian complaint is that the foreman of a French contractor or work-shop will always sack an Italian employee first and re-engage him last. But the same power is in the hands of the Italian capitalist employing French labour and until the Fascists ousted them, Italian Jews, mostly from Leghorn, were among the most powerful of the Tunisian capitalists. On the other hand the French can scarcely be expected not to discriminate against a nation which has continuously tried to undermine their own authority.

If you question a Fascist official on the irredentist movement, he will reply that it has nothing to do with Italy, but is the spontaneous reaction of the Italian community to the repressive measures of the French. This is sheer nonsense.

It is true that in the last few years the French have taken steps to protect their own interests. They have forbidden the wearing of Fascist uniforms, banned public demonstrations in favour of Italy, restricted immigration and curtailed the growth of Italian schools and institutions. But these steps were taken in self-defence. They were the inevitable answer to the Italian irredentist campaign. That campaign had culminated in the murder of an anti-fascist by the crew of an Italian warship

which was paying an official visit to Tunis. It was a situation which could not be tolerated by any self-respecting Government.

The fact is that the present state of affairs is the result of a deliberate policy, laid down in Rome and systematically carried out by Fascist officials under the leadership of the Italian Consul-General. The latter is directly responsible to the Duce for the conduct of the Italian community in Tunisia and he is more like a Governor of a province than a diplomat.

The Italian Consulate General is one of the largest buildings in Tunis; it has a staff of nearly a hundred and functions as a sort of unofficial Home Office, administering the Italian nationals. Ninety-nine per cent of the colonists are either enrolled in Fascist organisations—clubs, ex-servicemen's associations, cultural centres, etc.—or are otherwise controlled by the Consul-General. They take their orders from him or his subordinates and by dint of continuous propaganda in a subsidised local Press and through meetings and lectures are maintained in a state of patriotic fervour.

There is, therefore, no question of self-determination in the proper sense of the word. The Italian colonists in Tunisia no more dare express an opinion of their own than their compatriots in Italy. At one time they

MODERN BLACKMAIL MECHANICS



"Moscow News"

were by no means unanimous in their support of Fascism, but during the depression many of them were out of work and hungry and it was the Italian Consul-General who came to their rescue with funds supplied by the Treasury in Rome. Naturally the aid thus given was conditional. It had a political as well as a philanthropic motive.

To-day the Fascists have powerful means of persuading those who do not toe the line. The Italian hospitals, schools and charitable institutions in Tunisia are theoretically open to all Italians. But in practice a colonist known to be anti-fascist will soon find the doors closing against his family. He is also liable to be beaten up by Fascist opponents.

The schools are a most frequent cause of controversy with the French authorities. The latter, in order to discourage the irredentism of the Italian colony, refuse to allow any more to be built and the greatest difficulty is met with by the Italians in obtaining permission even to open an extra class-room. There are 14,000 children attending these schools, a high proportion of whom are being educated (as Italians) free. In addition they are fetched from their homes in buses, given free meals, milk and medical attention, and often clothes and boots as well.

Mussolini has spared no expense to keep alive the nationalism of the Italian community. Much of the work is admirable from a social point of view, but the underlying motive is only too obvious. If these people were destined eventually to become French citizens one cannot suppose that Fascism would have taken so much trouble with them. As it is they represent a solid alien bloc, nominally subject to French law, but in reality forming a State within the State. If ever Mussolini decided to invade Tunis, his nationals there would provide both a ready-made pretext and a spearhead sharpened to lead the attack from inside.

The Real Aim

Actually it seems unlikely that he has any such intention. Apart from the official Italian disclaimers of any territorial aim, Tunis is too well defended to invite attack, nor is France quite the same as Czechoslovakia. The immediate objective of Italy is to secure for her nationals in Tunisia, under the guise of equal rights, the same privileged status that they enjoyed under the Beys before the French occupation. In other words they are demanding the equivalent of a capitulatory system, with their own law-courts, immunity from taxation, and freedom from all political and economic restrictions. This, of course, the French will never grant—

it is as much as their own authority in Tunisia is worth—but they might, the Italians suppose, be induced to make concessions which would strengthen the position of the Italian colony.

Need for Haste

There are special reasons for wishing to strengthen it at the moment. The French claim that there are 108,000 French subjects in the Protectorate, as against 94,000 Italians. The Italians say they have 130,000 registered subjects and 20,000 non-registered. Whatever the real figures, the truth seems to be that the French population for various reasons has been growing faster than the Italian. Recently, partly as the result of the Italian anti-semitic laws, there has been a marked increase in the number of applications for French citizenship. This is a process which cannot be pleasing to Mussolini, since if it continues long enough there will be eventually no grounds left for any Italian claim in Tunis. He has to act now to stop the rot.

Italy, moreover, probably feels that the working of the Axis has so far benefited Germany exclusively. She considers it is her turn now to share in the fruits of Munich. Remembering that it was Bismarck who encouraged France to take Tunis, she is not too pleased by Ribbentrop's visit to Paris. She has every reason for striking while the iron is hot—not only in Tunis, but also in Spain, Jibuti and Suez.

DISAGREEABLE SURPRISE

How completely Hong Kong was surprised by the Japanese invasion of South China is suggested by the introduction in the Legislative Council of a record budget on the very day that the Japanese landed in Bias Bay. Revenue was estimated at $38,500,000 (£2,400,000), compared with $30,000,000 in 1936, the last normal year. Several public works, wisely delayed, were to be taken in hand on the strength of the trade revival due to the "incident" in China. These included a new Government House in place of the stately but rather inconvenient residence which dates back to the early days of the Colony. With the Pearl River closed, and the British capitalised Kowloon-Canton Railway in Japanese hands, Hong Kong is commercially isolated and will be in no position for extravagance.—*"Great Britain and the East," London.*

MACARONI AXIS

Japanese-made macaroni has Italy on the retreat according to latest reports in the trade papers. The Italian cruiser which was recently here on a visit left with a goodly load of it, and the sailors pronounced it equal to Italy's best. So now there are hopes of the Italian macaroni trade being captured.—*"Japan Chronicle," Kobe.*

THE ROAD TO ROME

WHAT FACES MR. CHAMBERLAIN

From the Rome Correspondent of the "Weltwoche," Zürich, 9.12.38

On another page Mr. George Martelli gives a survey of the situation in Tunis, which was unofficially claimed by Italy at the moment when Herr von Ribbentrop was signing a Franco-German Pact in Paris. Here we give a well-informed analysis of Signor Mussolini's aims from Rome

BEFORE the Rome demonstrations took place, there had been no lack of official hints that the claim to Tunis, Jibuti, Corsica, etc. would be made by Italy. If we look back now, we can see that Italian public opinion has been systematically prepared for a revolutionary settlement with France. Every time that Italian newspapers wrote about the German colonial demands, they added that this problem, even after the conquest of Abyssinia, was still "alive and actual" for Italy as well. References were made to the fact that the whole of Italian East Africa did not possess a single good harbour. Mogadiscio and Massawa were, they said, certainly admirable situated, but were for the time being useless for ships

of deep draught. The real harbour linking Abyssinia with the outside world was Jibuti, in French Somaliland; and this, therefore, "really rightly belonged" to Italian East Africa.

In general, it was clear that Italy was reckoning on receiving "something" on the occasion of the re-distribution of the African colonies which is anticipated sooner or later. And no doubt was permitted to exist that this "something" included Tunis. . . .

As regards Corsica, the island was "racially completely Italian." Both Tunis and Corsica formed in French hands a "constant threat" strategically. Tunis lay considerably closer to Sicily than Libya, and until the fortification of Pantelleria was completed, Tunis had exclusive control of the Straits of Messina. From Corsica the whole of North-West Italy could be covered from the air, and even Rome was within the radius of Corsican bombers. Italy was indeed an Empire now, but as long as Corsica and Tunis remained in French hands the Italian Kingdom was a "prisoner in the Mediterranean." So these two territories must, sooner or later, be added to Italy.

All these confessions of Italy's true intentions regarding France are all the more significant in that they coincide with the announcement of Chamberlain's approaching visit to Rome. In fact, we are almost forced to the conclusion that the cry, "We want Tunis and Corsica!" was meant as a kind of acoustic preparation for the English visitor, who was perhaps having it indicated to him in this rather remarkable way that Italy was not harbouring intentions on British, but "only" on French, possessions. The factor which, up to a short time ago (as they well know in Italy) was making government circles and the public in England most uneasy was uncertainty about Italy's further territorial intentions. Italy has conquered Abyssinia, they were saying in Whitehall; very well, but what next? Does she perhaps now want the Sudan, Egypt, Palestine or some other African or Asiatic territory connected with the British Empire? Nervousness in this respect had been weighing heavily on Anglo-Italian relations for a long while. Enormous trouble was taken to obtain clarification as to Italy's true aims; this was one of the chief objects of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. It gave the British the requisite assurance that Italy would not "spring a surprise" on them in the Mediterranean, in Africa or in Arabia. And after the Agreement came into force in November, the fears of Whitehall, and England, were indeed obviously quietened.

The proposal which Italy is making to-day, on the eve of Mr. Chamberlain's visit, means, therefore, in undiplomatic language, somewhat as follows: "From you we are demanding no further 'sacrifice'; with you we have settled our relations; with France, however, our relations are still 'completely unsettled'; from France we demand Tunis, Jibuti, Corsica, and perhaps Savoy as well, *and you are to help us to get France to accede to a 'courageous amputation' of these possessions.*"

What England will say to this, can be easily imagined. . . . Chamberlain, packing his trunks for Rome, and with him all the peace illusionists of the world, now find themselves once again faced by "brutal reality." Behind the cries of the "irresponsible young people" in Rome there can be seen the obvious intention to make it clear—particularly to England—that Italy still belongs to the unsatisfied Powers. Those cries have faced Europe with a completely new problem, about that there can be no doubt whatever. Nor can there be any doubt that they hint, to say the least of it, at the possibility of a violent day of reckoning in the Mediterranean. Looked at coldly, they represent nothing less than the resuscitation of the old Italian irredentism. Once it was directed against Austria, now it is turned against France; and now, as then, it expresses itself in violently formulated territorial demands. Are claims of this kind, Mr. Chamberlain must ask himself, ever to be satisfied by negotiation? Those of us who still remember the last World War, will know that all too often the big guns thundered an echo to the patriotic cries of "a few irresponsible young people." And we cannot remind the younger generation of this too often, that they may be fully aware of the times in which they live and the things that are still to come.

FUTILE SURPRISE
The Right to Tunis

From "Il Regime Fascista," Cremorna, 4.12.38

THE French Press continues to express surprise and occasionally anger because members of the Fascist Chamber, during Ciano's speech, when the minister declared that "Italy intends to safeguard with inflexible firmness the interests and the natural aspirations of its people," rose to their feet with cries of "Tunis!"

Such surprise represents an artificial attitude which it is in the interests of France to abandon, as it is generally known that the Italian question in Tunisia is by no means settled. If a real European *détente* is to be achieved, it is necessary, therefore, to solve this problem justly, thus removing a great source of friction between Rome and Paris, which has repercussions on European politics as a whole.

In 1881 France, in spite of false promises, occupied Tunisia and obliged the Bey by force to accept the Treaty of Bardo. The Italians had interests of first-rate importance in Tunisia and a special status which had been granted to them for centuries by the Bey and which had been finally confirmed by the Italo-Tunisian Treaty of 1868.

After various vicissitudes, in which, with the exception of Crispi, different Italian ministers showed exceptional weakness, owing to the secret influence of freemasonry, which was working for France and paralysing the action of our patriots, the Treaty was replaced by the Conventions of 1896, by which Italy recognised the French protectorate, gave up rights of great importance, but obtained on the other hand the assurance that its citizens would retain their status as Italians even though they might be the descendants of two or more generations established in the Regency; that Italian associations were recognised, that Italian schools were to be maintained and that an equable treatment should be granted to the Italians with respect to the French and the native population in the exercise of the arts, trades and professions.

Hostile France

Even though the spirit of the Conventions of 1896 *was subsequently constantly violated by France,* they remained as the last bulwark of our nationality in those lands, largely redeemed by our labour; labour which was absolutely vital to France for the exploitation of the Protectorate in which she has vainly tried to introduce French and foreign settlers in an effort to counterbalance, at least in part, Italian influence.

Even before the World War came to an end, in September 1918, while the earth was still fresh in which lay the graves of 5,000 Italian soldiers who had fallen in July at Bligny, fighting on French soil to save France for the third time since 1914, the government of Paris perpetrated an act of real hostility by denouncing the Conventions of 1896: these remained in force temporarily pending a new decision and were to be considered as tacitly renewed every three months. Thus was set up an

ignoble instrument of diplomatic blackmail, seeing that the fate of the Italians in Tunisia hung on a thread which it was in the power of the Paris government to cut at any moment. Then began a series of legislative measures inspired by the underhand intention of destroying the position of the Italians in Tunisia, notably the decree of February, 1919, which attempted to make it impossible for us to found schools or acquire landed property, and the law of December 20th, 1923, according to which, by a gradual process all foreigners were automatically "naturalised." This law, it is true, was not applicable to Italians, but, as has been seen, our only defence was reduced to the Conventions which were renewable every three months at the good pleasure of the Republic.

The Agreements with Laval of January 7th, 1935, were intended to remedy this situation, at least in part. But they never came into force either in the letter, or, even less, in the spirit. On the contrary, France's attitude after that date has been in open contrast to the friendly collaboration which it was intended to create between the two countries in the Mediterranean, and especially in Northern Africa.

Not only were sanctions applied against us; in addition France took up and maintained a position against us in the Spanish question; and persecution, ill-treatment and attacks against Italians in Tunis multiplied. It is useless to recall the various incidents which were continually repeated, especially recently, after the advent of the Popular Front in Paris. Nevertheless, in Tunisia the national spirit of the 120,000 Italians resident there, galvanised by Fascism, has remained unshakeable and



"Marianne"

"Take a map of France, and claim for me all the places printed in Italics!"



Paris

"Be ready from 4 to 7 to join the spontaneous popular indignation brigade."

ever more united: these Italians have resisted the many attempts made to denationalise them; numerically, they are a greater body than the so-called "French settlers" (who, as a matter of fact, are for the most part soldiers or civil servants or naturalised foreigners); they own 50 per cent of the vine-yards and landed estates to the value of two thousand million lire; also credit institutes, institutes for social collaboration, savings banks and schools which continue to flourish in spite of French opposition and persecution.

There is, therefore, no "new" Italian problem in Tunisia, no "new" demands have been formulated. It is not a question of resolving an immediate problem, but, apart from what the government's ideas may be as to the international situation, there is one enduring fact: *the right of Italians to look to that coast, which is also Italian.*

Recent French action has had inevitable consequences and reactions which are more than justified. Is it or is it not true that France, during the recent crisis, after having constructed vast defensive lines on the Tripolo-Tunisian frontier, assembled huge forces there to invade Tripolitania? Again, is it or is it not true that concentration camps for all Italians had been prepared on sites previously examined, which were in front of fortifications, almost as if to serve as a shield to the latter?

Fascism has only one programme; to combat all those forces which menace national security. And this programme will be carried out to the full.

One often hears talk of rights acquired and ratified by treaties. But almost every page of the Treaty of Versailles has been torn out; therefore, if one is to consider this treaty as superseded, a return should be made to the diplomatic and moral position of the Great War, to times when Italy won for itself far greater rights, sacrificing the flower of its youth to save France and England. It will be agreed that compared to such rights, Tunis does not represent a great deal.

A FEW "NEVERS"

The *Stampa,* of Turin, publishes under the title "Never" an article dealing with the many refusals of the French Government to Italian aspirations.

The list begins with "1860, Italy in Naples—never. 1870, Italy in Rome—never. 1911, Italy in Tripolis—never. 1919, Italy in Fiume—never. 1935, Italy in Addis Ababa—never. 1938, Italy in Tunis, Ajaccio—never, never, never."—*"Evening Standard."*

ROME COLONISES LIBYA
New Methods Explained

by MARSHAL ITALO BALBO

From "Nuova Antologia," Rome, November

AT the dawn of the 17th year of the Fascist era, 1,800 families have sailed for Libya, to make fertile with their efforts that which our might has already conquered. It has been the age-old mission of the Italian people to sail overseas and convert deserts into fertile lands; but there is an historical innovation this time: the settlers are sailing *en masse* to cultivate a territory which is an integral part of the fatherland, a territory which they will cultivate for the exclusive benefit of their native country. If we recall the ships which once carried Italians to all quarters of the globe, carried them to an uncertain fate, to the arduous toil by which they earned their bread, giving in exchange their sweat and their blood, one cannot fail to admire the Italians of Mussolini, who, freed from their century-old servitude, are now working with the energy and the constancy which are the mark of Fascist Italy, to recreate Libya and so to contribute to the salvation of the Fascist ideal of self-sufficiency. . . .

The policy followed in the past in Libya of giving large concessions of land to a few individuals had merely led to the creation of large landed estates; this was obviously in contradiction to the Fascist ideal of colonisation. This state of affairs served a useful purpose, however, in that it brought out the fact that Libya presented an adequate field of activity for our persevering Italian peasants. What was necessary in fact was to send a large number of settlers who would become attached to the soil they had conquered and transformed.

The first attempt at this type of colonisation was made by Luigi Razza, and I did not hesitate to extend its scope, transforming the "Corporation for Colonisation in Cirenaica" into the "Corporation for Colonisation in Libya." Moreover, I availed myself of the services of the Fascist Institute for Social Insurance. I was able to eliminate one or two errors committed in the past: instead of grouping the settlers' houses together, I obtained better results by spreading the homesteads over each plot of land. It also proved necessary to remove from amongst the early settlers those men who lacked the physical and moral qualities required in colonisation.

Colonisation is organised in the following manner:—The government grants land to the Corporation for Colonisation in Libya and the Fascist Institute of Social Insurance, at the same time undertaking public works in connection with land reclamation, such as the construction of roads, aqueducts, artesian wells and public buildings, and directing the activities of the bodies previously mentioned. These in their turn proceed to the allotment of the land and its division into *poderi* or small farms, and decide such questions as the number of years, the maximum being five, in which the improvement in the farm is to be accomplished, the work to be undertaken for buildings and water supply, the proportion between the land to be cultivated naturally and the land to be cultivated by irrigation, the number of families to be admitted, the determination of the cost of land reclamation, towards which the government grants a subsidy of 30 per cent.

The farms are then handed over to the settlers by means of a system of redemption spread over a number of years. After a trial period as a paid worker and then as part-owner, the farmer eventually becomes the complete owner of his land. The apportioning of land, which I have increased in the last few years by roughly half a million hectares, has completely transformed the nature of colonisation, and in view of the success which crowned our tireless efforts to seek artesian water, has revolutionised agrarian economy in Libya.

The plan presents difficulties owing to the varying climatic and geological conditions in Libya. Everywhere, however, the Corporation and the government have seen to it that the settlers on arrival in Libya find that the necessities of life and the equipment for work are provided. Thousands upon thousands of workmen were employed for the building of houses and streets and the installation of water supplies.

* * * * *

Altogether there are 1,800 farms in the four Libyan provinces, none exceeding 50 hectares in extent, and an equal number of families will make them their homes. This fine achievement, however, is to be only a stage in the plan for demographic colonisation, our aim being to fill to saturation point with Italian farmers those parts of Libya on which for centuries only shrubs and steppe plants have flourished. Let it be made quite clear that this will not be done to the detriment of the native population, but only where land had previously been lying idle or had been unsatisfactorily cultivated.

It was particularly important that the programme of demographic colonisation should be rapidly completed on the Green Gebel; and to ensure that the maximum number of settlers was established there, I did not hesitate to place a very severe strain on Libyan finances. Within one year, it will be possible to add another thousand families to the nine hundred allowed to enter at the beginning of the year XVII and to the 340 families previously settled there. The Gebel is placed in ideal climatic conditions and offers fine scope for agrarian development. In later years the less fertile regions will have to be considered, although cultivation will certainly be more difficult and may even involve terracing the land. Such work should, however, be possible as in a relatively short time there should be 50,000 Italians, including artisans and other workers, living on the Gebel.

The Arabs Are Not Forgotten

An equally important problem concomitant with the preceding is the necessity of providing for the Arabs who have had to leave the Gebel heights. To prevent the Arabs from feeling that intensive demographic colonisation means injustice for them, it has been necessary to ensure that pastures for their exclusive use were placed at their disposal, and to provide the best conditions under which the Arabs could cultivate the soil near the coast, both to reconcile their nomadic spirit with the demands of the Italian policy of stabilisation and to enable them at the same time to get the best results from the soil. The zone which runs from the Egyptian frontier to the southern part of Bengasi and on into Sirtica fully satisfies the need for adequate pasture land for the Arabs.

The difficulties are greater in connection with cultivation in the coastal strip where land is to be found suitable for the establishment of small irrigated farms. Recently considerable facilities have been granted to the Arabs, in the way of grants of land and otherwise, but results are by no means satisfactory, particularly in Eastern Libya, where the natives are even more attached to pastoral pursuits than in Tripolitania. The policy of land "concessions" therefore is no solution, and the government must take steps to ensure that the task of persuading the Arabs to combine the keeping of flocks with the cultivation of the soil, is properly carried out through government organisation, and not un-coordinated private enterprise. The Corporation for Colonisation in Libya has already chosen the centres for the coastal Arab townships, and the first villages are already being constructed.

Yet another problem, though less pressing, will call for a solution in the future. Large estates, situated in the most fertile zones, and extending for thousands of hectares, have been ceded to private persons, often, it must be admitted, with very good results. Nevertheless, these landed estates present a serious obstacle to the development of intensive demographic colonisation. Will such a state of affairs check the advance of the Italian settlers beyond the Gebel? The problem must be solved and it is noteworthy that about 1,000 settlers would not have sailed to Libya but for the fact that the Corporation and the Institute previously mentioned were able to purchase one or two of these estates, by no means the largest. Nor must it be forgotten that the task of dividing the large estate into many small holdings has been successfully accomplished in many parts of Italy where the problem was more wide-spread and more deep-rooted. Some rational solution must be found whereby Libya may offer an outlet for surplus population and at the same time attain self-sufficiency.

The Total Planned

As the plan for colonisation of the year XVI is brought to fruition, the Italians in Libya will number 140,000. In the following year the total will rise to 160,000. The natural racial increase; the irresistible advance of colonisation, which will not cease until every possibility has been exhausted; the increase in the population in relation to the complete development of the productive capacities of the land, whether agricultural, commercial or industrial: all these factors will mean that in less than ten years the Italians in Libya will have reached a total which is in adequate relation to the historic measure of annexation which I had the honour to propose to the Duce and which the Duce and the Grand Council have approved.

ON THE BATH FRONT

America is leading Britain by four bathrooms in a statistic which tends to show the cleanliness of the peoples of the world. In the U.S.A. 35 bathrooms are available for every 1,000 people.

In Great Britain 31; Germany 26; Switzerland, Holland, Denmark 20; Belgium 18; France 14; Japan 12; Czechoslovakia 10; Norway 8; Italy and Hungary 6; Poland, Spain, Portugal 4; Rumania 2; Jugoslavia 1, and in Russia there is only one bathroom to every 10,000 people.

But there are many public baths in Russia which have not been included in the statistics.—*"Evening Standard."*

THE CLAIM TO EMPIRE

IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY

by WOLF SCHIRRMACHER

From "Der Angriff," Berlin, 23.11.38

Dr. Goebbels's paper might with truth have done better than this. In the Boer concentration camps no less than 20,177 women and children (15,378 children) died of exposure, famine and disease, not including the others who failed to survive being turned out in midwinter onto the Veld before the camps were established and official mortality figures recorded. But he omits other vital facts also—that it was an Englishwoman, Miss Emily Hobhouse, who first investigated and exposed the horrors of the camps; England itself was among the countries in which, while the war was still in progress, she collected aid for the Boer women and children; and it was the future English Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who publicly denounced this way of conducting war as "methods of barbarism." It is worth recording that Emily Hobhouse's action and that of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had the effect of creating a psychological readiness to make peace among men who had been only roused to more bitter resistance by ill-treatment of their families

WE are heartily uninterested in English affairs, but as long as warmongers in the British Parliament and Press interfere with and lie about *our* affairs, we shall throw a little light on English colonial methods. The "humanity" of English policy has created many truly remarkable situations.

When, at the end of last century, gold was discovered in South Africa, British imperialism suddenly found it could no longer stand the independence of the Boer Republics of Orange and the Transvaal. Following complaints of British settlers, made by order, the country was to be "incorporated" in the British Empire. As the Boers offered bitter resistance, their country was overthrown and ravaged by the cruellest methods by an army of 150,000 men under Lord Roberts and Kitchener.

Seventy-five per cent of all the Boer farms went up in flames, set on fire by the English. Lord Roberts declared in a proclamation: "Everywhere where even an attempt is made to destroy the railway line, all

farms within a radius of ten miles will be destroyed, all food removed and the inhabitants driven away." Boer women and children were herded into concentration camps. They had to live and sleep crowded together behind barbed wire in the open. They were completely at the mercy of the soldiers.* In one camp, 196 women and children died. In all camps in no less than 1,767 children died in one month, December, 1901. According to official reports there were 117,017 white persons in the camps in December, 1901, and of these 2,380 died in that one month alone.

Out of that dark chapter of English history, her Indian policy, only the English reign of terror in Amritsar in April, 1919, need be men-

* *Accusations against the British soldiers are sheer libel. Reports show that they were themselves disgusted at the "methods of barbarism" and did what they could to alleviate them.*

THE CHURCH'S PLEA FOR THE JEWS
(according to the Nazis)

One heart,
one soul,
one God,
one collecting box.

"Die Brennesel"
Berlin

tioned. General O'Dyer ordered his machine guns to fire without previous warning into a closely compressed, peaceful gathering of 16,000 Indians, until there was no more ammunition left. The Indians had no chance to defend themselves or to escape. A Government Commission examined the affair and could only confirm the atrocity. O'Dyer declared he had wanted to make a "moral impression" on the whole Punjab by these measures. The Upper House rejected even the slightest disapproval of his act.

We would remind all democratic governesses too, of the French reprisals in Syria after the Druse rebellion against military rule in Damascus. On the 15th October, 1925, over a hundred Syrian prisoners were shot in the market place of Damascus. On the 18th October the whole city, "by way of punishment" was almost completely destroyed by bombers and artillery.

Rigorous censorship at first prevented any details about the number of dead and the destruction of art treasures and buildings from reaching the public. Later the French authoress, Alice Poulleau, made a passionate protest against this military terrorism in her book, *Damascus Under Bombs*. She describes her meeting with a well-known anti-German journalist, and her indignation when he did not allow a word about this atrocity to appear in his paper. We should like to remind him of the pictures of senseless destruction which he then witnessed, and also to advise the clique of English hate-mongers to study conditions in the neighbouring state of Palestine.

THE BIGGEST HAVE-NOT

by DR. PAUL ROHRBACH (BERLIN)

From the "Deutsche Tagespost," Cernauti, Rumania, 20.11.38

CONSIDER the following facts:

47 million Englishmen own 140 times the area of their mother country in colonies and allied Dominions;

40 million Frenchmen own 21 times the area of France;
8 million Dutchmen own 60 times the area of Holland;
8 million Belgians own 80 times the area of Belgium;
7 million Portuguese own 26 times the area of Portugal;
43 million Italians own 10 times the area of Italy;
And 78 million Germans own. . . ?

Deductions can be made from the areas given for England, France and Italy, since in their colonies, including the English Dominions, parts consist of Arctic or desert districts, as in Canada, the Sahara and Central Australia. That these regions are worthless on that account, no one will maintain. Any day mineral treasures may be discovered in them; they form links between well-populated territories in the possession of the same nations, while modern technical methods are opening up districts further towards the Pole and deeper into the deserts than would have been thought possible in other days. The Colonial possessions of the above-mentioned nations, with the exception of Germany, remain, therefore, even after all climatic deductions, so immense that by contrast even the old German colonies, which totalled 6 times the area of the German Reich at that time, appear very modest.

The German Führer said in Munich that the return of the colonies was not a matter of war, but a "question of justice and of the real intention to make it possible for the nations to live together." It is an illusion on the part of the peoples and governments, who have illegally robbed Germany of her colonial possessions, if they believe they will ever be able to establish lasting friendly relations with the German nation without making good this injustice.

How They Cheated

Typical of English lack of understanding of others is a German-English conversation which was reported to me when I was on my tour of investigation this year in East Africa: The German: "Do you really believe that Germany will ever abandon her claim to colonies?" The Englishman: "If we play bridge this evening and you lose ten shillings, would you come to me tomorrow and ask for your money back?"

The German: "What would you have to say if I were to prove to you that you had been playing with marked cards?" The Englishman: ? ? ? (completely at a loss to understand).

You can ask a hundred Englishmen, and not ten of them will know that the marked cards which the Allies shuffled into the pack when the game for the German Colonies was being played was the lying Blue Book on reputed ill-treatment of natives, especially in South-West Africa.

The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, General Hertzog, said of this concoction: "The unreliability and unworthiness of this document is sufficient to condemn it to an ignominious burial along with all other similar documents of the war period."

Shall the German people forget that it was cheated of its colonial possessions with the help of a libel? That President Wilson was given the Blue Book in order to induce him to surrender the fifth of his Fourteen Points? This point contained the promise of a completely just and impartial treatment of the colonial question at the conclusion of peace. But when the German delegates at Versailles protested against the taking away of the colonies, the reply was: "It is impossible to hand you over the natives whom we have freed from your ill-treatment!"

Wilson's private secretary, Baker, relates how Lloyd George overcame the other allied delegates in the colonial question and made his decisive argument that the Germans wanted to exterminate the natives in South-West Africa! All from the lying Blue Book! General Hertzog is not the only one who condemned it; the parliament of South-West Africa annulled it as an untruthful instrument of war propaganda, by unanimous vote of its German, Boer and English members. That was as far back as 1925. Since then Germany has been waiting to see whether those concerned would draw the conclusions from the confession that they had cheated. We are of the opinion that confession and reparation should go together. So was the late Lord Snowden, former English Chancellor of the Exchequer, and so are some distinguished and honourable Englishmen to-day. Will they have their way and "make it possible for the peoples to live together"?

Now we hear another excuse. General Smuts, the inventor of the mandate swindle, said even at Versailles that the Germans in Africa were dangerous neighbours! So they were not to have colonies. Did Smuts mean Lettow Vorbeck by any chance? It seems more likely that he wanted to hint that the Germans had opened hostilities in Africa. That is demonstrably false; the Allies were everywhere the first to attack.

LOYAL BUTTER

Mr. Boulanger, M.P. for one of the Federal seats of Quebec province, voiced the sentiments of French-Canadians when he said recently:—

"Canada is neither responsible for European discords; nor interested in British Empire affairs outside of Canada.

"Canadians should notify Great Britain that Canada is for Canadians; and will not permit a single man to fight for anything but Canadian interests."

Small wonder that a West of England grocer displayed the sign:—

"NEW ZEALAND BUTTER IS *LOYAL* BUTTER."—*"News Review."*

THE RUSSO-POLISH PACT
The Significance for the Future

From the "Nationalzeitung," Basle, 30.11.38

"Who sups with the devil, requires a long spoon" is a maxim which the Polish government appears not to have remembered when it joined in the game of grab for Czecho-Slovakian territory. Alarmed at subsequent developments, it has now turned to Soviet Russia for support. But can this be described by another adage, as "shutting the stable door when the horse has gone"? Here we give the opinion of the political leader-writer of this Swiss paper who is usually sound in his judgment

THE surprising news has come from Moscow that the conversations which have been taking place between Litvinov and the Polish Ambassador, Grzibowski, have led to a Russo-Polish declaration of friendship. Frontier disputes are to be liquidated, trade relations extended; above all, it is solemnly affirmed that the non-aggression pact concluded in 1932 and later prolonged until 1945 retains complete validity.

It is only two months since the Soviet Government pointed out in a distinctly threatening manner that Poland must regard the non- aggression pact as cancelled if the latter seized Teschen from Czechoslovakia by force. The Warsaw Government replied in such an arrogant tone that nobody could have imagined that two months later Poland would be making a voyage to Canossa and be begging for Russian goodwill.

Yet this is just what has happened. It is clear that Poland, in the face of the rapidly increasing deterioration of her relations with Germany, could think of nothing better to do than to seek re-insurance in Moscow. What a triumph for Russia, which seemed to have been completely pushed out of European politics, which scarcely saw any way of escaping from gradual encirclement by an enemy coalition, inclusive of Poland; and which now through this same Poland has not only been given a far-reaching guarantee of her frontiers, but is being led back into European politics!

The reason for Poland's sensational change of front is, of course, Germany's attitude in the Carpathian Russian (Carpatho-Ukraine) question, and her plans for the creation of a "Greater Ukraine." The fact that Germany has prevented the formation of the Polish-Hungarian

frontier barrier might in time be stomached in Warsaw. But the fact that Carpathian Russia, now that it stands open to German penetration within the Czecho-Slovak State, is to be made into a propaganda centre for the Ukrainians, must be regarded by Poland as a direct threat.

It is not only the 30 million Soviet Russian Ukrainians whom German imperialism wants to draw into its sphere of influence; in Poland too, there are about 7,000,000 Ukrainians, who would probably respond much more readily than the Soviet Ukrainians to the siren voices calling for a "United Ukrainian State."

For the past three years in particular the Polish Government has been conducting a completely crazy campaign of "Polonisation" against its Ukrainian minority in Galicia and Volhynia. Up to 1935 the Ukrainian popular democratic union, "Undo," the Polish Ukrainian's most important organisation, was ready to co-operate with the Government. But now the Polish campaign of destruction against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the police terrorism used against Ukrainian efforts at cultural autonomy, have immensely strengthened the separatist movement. It is known in Warsaw that it would not need much to bring about an open insurrection in the Ukrainian districts, it is feared that German policy is working for a civil war in Poland, in order to liquidate the Danzig question, the Corridor problem, etc. without difficulty. So the Warsaw Government has now thrown its arms round the neck of Soviet Russia, in order not to be caught simultaneously in the pincers by Germany and Russia.

Moscow's Advantages

Poland is evidently ascribing to Moscow the rôle of a gendarme who is to stand guard on her eastern frontier. Will Russia be content with this rôle? True, this affirmation of Russo-Polish friendship offers Russia great advantages—Moscow can now watch Hitler's threats to Soviet Ukraine much more calmly. Russia will certainly also be able to make use of the agreement with Warsaw to bring about a *rapprochement* under her patronage between the Baltic countries and Poland which would bar the way to Leningrad.

The agreement may above all become, provided it is seriously meant, of great importance in relations between the Soviet Union and the democratic Western Powers. One of France's great difficulties has always been how to get her two allies, Poland and Russia, to unite in a common

policy against Germany. If the misunderstandings between Warsaw and Moscow have now been removed, the Daladier-Bonnet Government, which since Munich has only unwillingly left the Franco-Soviet pact in force, can regard the Soviet Union with more confidence. Unexpectedly, France, who thought she had lost all influence in Eastern Europe, sees a Russo-Polish union of interests growing, which naturally at one stroke renews the strength of her position as regards Germany. As far as Moscow is concerned, we may be sure they will be clever enough to make clear to the French all the advantages the latter stand to gain by the agreement, and thereby renew their claim to a right to speak when European decisions are made.

A Double Game?

Nevertheless, we cannot suppress a doubt whether the Soviet Government will really play an honest game with Poland. Russia cannot want to allow the Ukrainians in Poland to be raped; if there is to be any talk of a "Greater Ukraine," then Russia, it may be supposed, will aim at its being one within the framework of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are about two million White Russians (Belorussians) whom re-awakened Russian imperialism is claiming for the Russian Motherland. The regime of Polish "landlords and Colonels" is in the eyes of the Soviet scarcely less repellent than the Hitler regime; neither of them can be regarded by the Soviet Union with real friendship, whatever treaties she may be ready to conclude with them. But while Russia does not need to fear Poland, National Socialist Germany always remains a dangerous competitor to Bolshevik Russia; and so we may be justified in believing that while they are rejoicing in Moscow at being able to welcome Poland as an ally against the Third Reich, and while they will make every possible use of the advantages offered by the agreement, *an arrangement with Germany at the expense of Poland is simultaneously being considered.* Russia has only agreed to a non-aggression pact with Poland, not to a pact of mutual assistance, and there is nothing to prevent her from merely watching while Germany forces her will on Poland. For Moscow now has the opportunity of obtaining a reward from Berlin for her "do-nothing" policy. Will the great decisive battle between bolshevism and national socialism end with a partition of Poland? The news that Poland and Russia have effected a *rapprochement* in order to resist the German threat in no way excludes such a possibility for the future.

IN DARKEST POLAND

Nemesis at Hand?

From "La Lumière" (Left Wing), Paris, 2.12.38

DURING the last few months Polish policy has surprised many observers. At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis Poland seemed firmly attached to the totalitarian axis; but as soon as it was over the situation changed completely. We have seen an open struggle, with the Polish government calling on Italian diplomacy to support Hungarian demands for certain parts of Czechoslovak territory against the German programme.

This lack of coherent aims is greeted on the banks of the Vistula with resigned fatalism. The most clear-sighted follow the evolution of events as mere spectators, unable to intervene or even to make their voices heard. Some reflect on melancholy historical precedents. Others search, without much hope, for some promise for the future. Still others let themselves be carried by the current, thinking that "something is bound to turn up." But what? No one knows. The fact is that the extreme variability of Polish policy reflects a real lack of continuity. This impression of disorder is accentuated if we take into account certain aspects of the life of the country.

"Forty per cent of our population consists of national minorities," I was told by an intellectual who is very well informed concerning the state of mind of the masses. "How then has our government dared to make 'minority,' and what is worse, territorial, demands? Our situation does not authorise such an attitude. And from now on the consequences of that mistake will be felt."

* * * * *

Vilna is in a curious situation. Only yesterday it was still theoretically the Lithuanian capital, and in fact, the principal city of a Polish province. It is a lost capital since a Polish ultimatum obliged the Lithuanian parliament to strike out of its constitution the article conferring this high dignity on the important, mostly Jewish, city. But throughout the countryside, you can easily see that the terribly complex problem is far from having been solved by this change in text. For in the wretched villages there is a large Belo-Russian (White Russian) population which has its own point of view. Fifteen years ago these agricultural workers

probably had no very definite national orientation. They would have accepted Lithuanian sovereignty without enthusiasm and without bitterness. For a time they resigned themselves to endure the Polish administration established as the result of a lucky military coup. They are still resigned to it, but with what sort of a spirit? Here we see a little town populated for the most part by old men. Where are the able-bodied men? They have gone to seek their fortunes elsewhere, or are in prison. The women too. What does that mean? Too many people are discontented, and so. . . .

Some small prosaic details will explain a good deal. In this village, as in the others, the people make their meals off potatoes and then eat the peelings. Salt is an article of luxury. A match is cut in two or even four pieces to be used several times. On top of this they pay heavy taxes.

Poverty and Dreams

The White Russian peasant is in a cleft stick. The "red" frontier which arbitrarily cuts his land in two exerts a comprehensible fascination over some. The Lithuanian peasant who lives in the neighbourhood, hesitates between that mysterious frontier and the equally enigmatic one bordering his little independent country, which he knows so little about. So many mysteries surrounding a modest country disputed by three peoples are more than enough to give rise to dreams. Men think of escaping, literally and figuratively, from the real world which is crushing them. That is not very easy, for the frontier is hermetically sealed on both sides.

In the important centres the situation of the middle classes is no better. Here life is hard too. Wretchedness is spread out to view in the streets. A small characteristic detail: in the cabarets one can ask for half-a-glass of soda water, for the difference between its price and that of a whole glass is considered essential.

Let us travel southwards, along the Soviet border. First the former Austrian territories whose fate was decided without local aspirations being taken into account. Here also, in the Ukrainian villages, life is hard. Not as bad as in the White Russian regions, but still hard. The police realise it. They dare not venture into the countryside except in groups of three or four. The population is less docile here than elsewhere. They think not so much of evading as of opposing the Polish administration.

That is easy to understand. The Ukrainian population forms a compact mass of several million souls. It feels its strength, and the Polish authorities find themselves in such a bad position that instead of tolerating small periodic pogroms—a few killed and wounded—they are looking for help even to the Jewish minority in the towns. Ukrainian agitation is now undergoing a strong revival. I had thought that, as in the White Russian regions, the nearness of the Soviet frontier played a certain part. I was told that this was no longer so. The discontent of the peasants is exploited by agitation, but at the present moment it is directed by nationalistic groups, radically opposed to communism. And it is German influence which has been growing stronger since the Czechoslovak problem was "settled."

That is an important fact. The Ukrainian lands along the Polish frontier form the link between Czechoslovak and Russian territory. For the first time the German thrust towards the eastern plains has attained definite geographical form. But how will that affect the destiny of Poland? The profoundest minds are little inclined towards optimism. I heard someone say: "They are careful about our eastern frontier where there is an important German minority, but no one mentions the 'corridor' though it constitutes a terrible problem. We are being attacked subtly. without territorial demands, by means of an intermediary."

The Ukrainian agitation, the ground for which has been prepared by brutal economic exploitation and crazy national persecutions undertaken by reactionary Polish leaders, and which is strengthened by German emissaries, is striking the most unexpected and hardest blow against the present directors of Polish policy. That is what was really involved when they demanded the creation of a Polish-Hungarian frontier—illusory dike against the Hitlerian tide. But the battle is lost from now on.

According to the latest news the Polish government, after the rebuff it has just received from its Italian friends, is looking for a new means of salvation. It is approaching the U.S.S.R. But now that the harm has been done it is hard to re-establish a seriously compromised situation. At the same time as the new Polish-Russian declaration the official nomination is announced of a German military man to the post of "counsellor" to the autonomous government of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine. formerly Sub-Carpathian Czechoslovak Russia (Ruthenia). . . .

ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY
Britain And U.S. Diverge

by ANNE O'HARE McCORMICK
From the "New York Times Magazine"

MR. ROOSEVELT is always ready, even eager, to discuss foreign affairs. No recent President, not even Wilson, has been so world-minded, so well suited by interest in international politics and understanding of other countries to be his own Foreign Secretary. Foreign affairs are now uppermost in his thoughts. He recognises that Munich was a turning point, for this country no less than for the powers immediately concerned. He believes that the implications of the four-power decisions, and what has happened since, force this country to re-examine and perhaps to revise its policy.

The President's own view of his external policy is that it has been perfectly consistent from the very beginning of his term of office. He recalls that in his first inaugural address he laid down the two main lines of his foreign programme—international economic readjustment and the "good neighbour" policy. He admits that the jolts of recent months have affected the international position of the United States and caused him to add a third line—rearmament—to supplement and reinforce the other two.

Looking at the world to-day, listening at the end of a long-distance telephone—for the rulers of the world were never before in such frequent and informal communication—Mr. Roosevelt perceives that the attitude of this country must be adapted to new conditions. The readjustment is not easy, if only for the reason that nothing can any longer be taken for granted. Like other capitals, Washington is facing two ways, uncertain whether the world is entering another Napoleonic era or an era of appeasement. In its uncertainty it is preparing for both, and it is this double-edged policy which makes it seem to be constantly contradicting itself.

In the President's view this contradiction is more apparent than real. He holds that we have to move in opposite directions at the same time in order to reach the same objective. We have to keep on enunciating moral principles, he says, to keep the record straight. Simultaneously we have to arm. Now that parades of force have the effect of real battles, now that the weight of a nation's influence equals the weight

of its armaments, "you have to carry a big gun," he smiles, "even to sit at peace tables."

This line of policy, the line of defence, was not laid down on March 4th, 1933. At his inauguration Mr. Roosevelt spoke for "a stricken nation in a stricken world," but it was not a world at war. Hitler had become Chancellor of Germany just five weeks before. The President often remarks that the New Deal and the Third Reich were produced by the same crisis. But even when the German Republic foundered and America was engulfed in the universal depression, he thought of every contingency but war. It seemed to him then that the policies he announced would help Germany, too, in the peaceful resolution of her grave problems.

One was a search for international economic readjustments to restore world trade. With this object in view, because he was convinced that economic solutions were more vital to recovery than political remedies, he appointed Cordell Hull Secretary of State. He sponsored the London conference. Yet he did not hesitate to scuttle this conference when he decided that domestic recovery depended on measures at variance with the London programme.

This is interesting as an early sidelight on Mr. Roosevelt's attitude on foreign affairs. He has supported Mr. Hull's patient efforts for reciprocal trade treaties. He calls them the cornerstone of the international policy of the Administration. He is certainly an internationalist —but he is not an internationalist first. His foreign policy will always be secondary to domestic policy and responsive to home sentiment.

The other policy introduced into the inaugural address was that of the good neighbour, "the good neighbour who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbours. . . ."

Building An American System

This is the direction in which the President looks when he beholds his old idea of "regional organisation" developing in a form and manner he did not foresee. Is the world dividing into planetary systems—Japan over Asia, Germany over Central Europe, the British Commonwealth, Russia? If so, then an American system is also in construction, with Mr. Roosevelt in the role of architect and builder.

In many ways this is the most important and potential of all current

international developments. Recent events have quickened the trend by making the Western Hemisphere conscious of itself and its position.

There is method in the effort of the Administration to play down differences in Mexico, to blink at the tentative moves farther south to test the temper of Uncle Sam, to work for the peaceful settlement of boundary disputes and minimise internal disorders in Latin-American States and insist on their essential democracy. The President is bent on buttressing a structure like an American league of nations. In publicly committing this country to the defence of Canada against aggression he included in the all-American system the only country in the New World belonging to another system. In giving notice to the world that such a system exists, in the sense that it would unite to defend itself against any form of outside invasion, he revealed the trend of his own mind and the direction in which American policy is clearly moving.

The Pan-American policy ties into the trade policy. It is not for

LATIN AMERICA

"What are you doing under my bed?"

"Psst! I only want to protect you from the Nazis!"

'Kladderadatsch'
Berlin.

economic reasons alone that the State Department has concentrated on opening up or keeping open the channels of international commerce. With each year Washington has become increasingly aware that foreign trade is more than an exchange of products. For the first time it is becoming evident that the democratic system itself may depend on freeing trade from the controls that turn it into an instrument of national policy and kill competition based on business principles.

The Anglo-American trade treaty is expected by the White House to put a roof over the Hull agreements and a foundation under the whole shaken structure of world commerce. The negotiations between London and Washington have been nearly wrecked a dozen times in the course of these parleys. Each side has seemed a cruel bargainer to the other. If the issue did not involve the ability of the British and the Americans to get together on anything; if Secretary Hull were not obstinately determined to force this crowning treaty through and the British were not keenly interested in forging a symbol of Anglo-American co-operation, it is doubtful whether agreement could ever have been reached.

Mixed Feelings for Mr. Chamberlain

There is no longer talk in Washington of a "parallel line" with Great Britain. At this moment both governments are going their separate ways. Mr. Chamberlain is smashing ahead, regardless, with his peace-at-a-price policy, and Mr. Roosevelt is watching the attempt with mixed feelings. Washington is demanding the maintenance of the Open Door in China, and London, despite or perhaps because of Hong Kong and her greater stake in East Asia, is holding back and saying nothing. Yet if the two English-speaking powers do not harmonise their attitude toward Japan they are not likely to co-operate elsewhere. And this would leave this country alone and independent in a new sense.

Unpredictable events of the last few months have forced Mr. Roosevelt to add the third line—rearmament—to his foreign policy. When the President says that American policy is at a transition point he implies that certain safeguards on which this country has counted for security no longer insure. Distance, for instance; the force of the world's traditional policemen; the power of wealth; the strength of democracy.

"Munich was a great lesson to me," he says soberly, meaning that it brought home the military unpreparedness of the United States, but also that it shifted a great burden of responsibility to this country. The

President is convinced that his peace effort was heartily approved by the American people and that the Munich decisions, and what they imply, are having a distinct effect on American policy.

The first effect, as has been said, is the stronger emphasis on the unity and co-operation of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. This is the new "front" toward which we are moving. Developments in Europe make the Inter-American conference at Lima in December a much more important meeting than it would have been if held three months ago. To-day the Monroe Doctrine is interpreted as a guarantee of the right of all American States to work out their own salvation without foreign interference.

The second is the determination to arm. Actually we are trailing in the armaments race, but Mr. Roosevelt is determined to make up for lost time and a late start.

Vast Arms Scheme

The capital is stirred by the vast preparedness plans now under discussion. The President is stirred more than any one. Instinctively a big-navy, big-air-fleet man, he attacks the problem of defence with drive and gusto. The chance has come to push a programme he has long held to be necessary, and his eye gleams as he pictures a fighting machine that can stand up to any military power. It includes a navy big enough to patrol two oceans; an airfleet far outnumbering the invisible German armada that overpowered the British and French without dropping a bomb; large-scale organisation of air bases, supply lines, barracks, war industries of all kinds.

The President believes a new epoch is beginning, but concentration on a large-scale defence programme demonstrates Washington's profound doubt that it will be an epoch of peace. The watchword is "Arm! Arm! Arm!" At the same time, as a counterpoise, the Administration holds that armament should never be mentioned without a declaration of the desire of this country to discuss disarmament. Nor should the policies of other countries be condemned, it is added, without an expression of the readiness of this government to sit down at a table and discuss alternative policies. Mr. Roosevelt thinks this should have been done long ago with respect to Germany. He has no intention of taking a lead, but it is evident that the idea of a conference is still in the back of his head.

The rearmament plans began last August, but now it is felt that the

estimates of defence needs made then are "infinitely too low." The revision upward followed the shock of Munich. As Mr. Roosevelt talks of the tense days in September, when the fear of war hung over the earth, the listener perceives what a shock it was. To hear the drama rehearsed by one who influenced the action almost as much as the participants is to see it in new perspective and to understand what it means to occupy a place of great power and responsibility in a time of crisis.

Action in the Crisis

You see the impact of events upon the White House, during those days a receiving station for reports, alarms and frantic appeals from every capital. You see the President seizing a pencil as the voice of Hitler in the Sportpalast speech beat against the walls of the executive office and summoning the Secretary of State. It was that voice that impelled him to hurry off his first note. You see the Cabinet listening to the weary voice of Chamberlain. The first appeal has failed of effect, but Mr. Roosevelt is moved by the hopeless tone of the Prime Minister to try once more. Seated at the head of the table, he dashes off the rough draft of the second note and reads it to his colleagues.

You see what a part the radio played in heightening the panic and excitement even in the seats of government. The voices crowding the air made the danger near and urgent. They transmitted to the rulers of the world the emotion and suspense of the people. It is extraordinary that both the President's appeals to Hitler were dispatched earlier than was intended because of news heard over the radio in advance of official information.

You see how difficult it was for a man with power to act to fail to act under such pressure. In Washington there is no doubt that Hitler meant to march. Mr. Roosevelt felt he "had to do something" to stop him, and his advisers agreed. He deplores all that led up to Munich, yet he continues to take the liveliest satisfaction in the part he played in the last act of the drama. Not only did he intervene himself; he urged fifty-eight other nations to do likewise, and he has his own timetable to prove that this intervention might have turned the scale.

Just whose influence, if any, deterred Hitler from fighting for a victory he received as a gift, or why there should be competition for the credit, doesn't matter, except as a point of historic interest. No testimony advanced so far, however, disproves that Mr. Roosevelt's telegram to

Mussolini—a brief, informal message something like: "You know Hitler. Can't you do something?"—reached the Duce at 9.30 on the morning of the fateful Wednesday, nearly an hour before Lord Perth arrived with the British appeal, or that the President's second note arrived in time to account for Hitler's change of temper. The German Chancellor is said to have referred twice to the American note in the interview with M. François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, who is responsible for the report that the Führer was "a changed man" on Wednesday morning.

More important is the fact that the voice of the United States was heard in the crisis, that the President is convinced that his peace effort was heartily approved by the American people, and that the Munich decisions, and what they imply, are having a distinct effect on policy.

On this side of the world the policy is clear. In Europe it is held in suspense while Mr. Chamberlain pursues his chosen line. The immediately pressing question for this government is Japan. The American stand with respect to the Open Door in China and the obligations of the Nine-Power Pact is more definite than practical. How to maintain that stand alone worries the policy makers. That is one reason why the moves for a European settlement are followed with anxiety in Washington. Appeasement there, it is felt, would lead to a stronger support of British and French interests in China. What else it might lead to this government does not yet foresee.

Concretely, the President may be expected to press Congress for an early revision of the Neutrality Act. Despite the fact that we are warier than ever as to commitments, and that Mr. Roosevelt is as wary as the wariest, it is plain that the Neutrality Act is a handy instrument of policy which he would like to be free to use in an emergency. If this instrument were more flexible, it might easily keep us out of war, he says, by enabling us to strengthen and support our own interests.

Influence on Palestine

He may be expected to work quietly on the British to keep Palestine open to Jewish immigration. That the British Government will keep faith with the Zionists he does not doubt. He speculates on something more. Instead of farther circumscribing the homeland, he wonders if a compromise could not be found by which it might be extended a little if the British give compensation to the Arabs in the form of irrigation, housing, farm equipment, to enable them to develop their land on a scale comparable to that of the Jews.

Concern for Palestine is only one indication of the deep interest taken by Mr. Roosevelt in the refugee question. He is stirred and angered by the problem foisted on the world by the "dumping" and dispersal of unwanted citizens without thought either of their future or of the difficulties they create for other countries. Quite apart from its humanitarian aspect, the question of refugees seems to him a major irritant in the relations between nations and an international issue of major importance.

As the President sees it, there is no peace now. The world surveyed from the White House is grim, the horizon darkened by armaments and, supposing military conflict can be averted by a balance of armed force, by the prospect of relentless trade war with new weapons and on an unprecedented scale. If Mr. Roosevelt clings to his original lines of foreign policy, now backed by a defence programme, perhaps it is because he senses that they may turn out to be alternative lines; he may have to fall back on an all-American policy as against reciprocal business with the rest of the world. Or he may have no choice.



Dublin Opinion

EIRE WITH AN EYE ON ULSTER

"Oh, Mother dear, come over here and see who's looking in my window."

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF

The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

THE FORGOTTEN PEACE

BREST-LITOVSK. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. *Macmillan.* 21s.

Reviewed by CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS

THERE are few living writers who can better combine learning and accuracy with picturesqueness of narrative than Mr. Wheeler-Bennett. At the neglected shrine of Clio, the Muse, he is one of the moderns' few remaining worshippers, and it would be difficult for the reviewer to exaggerate the pleasure with which he has read this book. The publisher's wrapper tells us how an understanding of the policies of Brest-Litovsk will help us to an understanding of the contemporary policies of Herr Hitler. But, however that may be, Mr. Wheeler-Bennett is too good an artist to spoil his narrative by too much preaching, and he leaves us to draw such lessons for ourselves. He is content with his own tale, and a very fascinating tale it is.

It may seem ungracious to argue with a book that has given me such high pleasure. Yet in truth to argue with an author is the highest compliment that one can pay to him. It is Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's thesis that the German conduct at Brest-Litovsk was wholly unprincipled. Partly to please the Reichstag and partly to please the Bolsheviks, the Germans pretended to accept the formula of self-determination, but then they proceeded dishonestly to interpret this formula in such a way as to enable them to impose a peace of pure power-politics.

As Mr. Wheeler-Bennett very well and clearly brings out, there was a very deep divergence between von Kühlmann and the General Staff. Von Kühlmann was anxious, if possible, to bring away from Brest-Litovsk a peace that would appear to the world an honest application of the formula of self-determination. Myself I believe that there was a genuine streak of idealism in him. His very cynicism had, in a measure, I think, turned him idealist. He was sickened with the "bunk" and the folly of war, and did perhaps truly think that the formula of self-determination might be the formula which would save the world from a repetition of this madness. If so, it was of the first importance that on the first occasion of its application, it should gain the precedent of being applied honestly.

But, whether von Kühlmann had such feelings or not, he certainly had the motive for moderation which Mr. Wheeler-Bennett ascribes to him. He was under no illusion that Germany was going to win the war. He knew very well that she would soon have to be negotiating for peace with her Western enemies, and argued that her chances of getting moderate terms in the West would be improved if only she could give an example of moderate dealings in the East.

On the other hand the General Staff looked at the question entirely from the point of view of strategic advantages for the next war. They greatly overestimated the chances of success in the West, and Hindenburg was frankly determined to detach Russia's Baltic provinces from her in order to give himself room to manœuvre his left wing in the next war.

I have therefore no quarrel at all with Mr. Wheeler-Bennett in his condemnation of the motives of the German General Staff. But I would suggest that, in his anxiety to condemn the motives from which the General Staff wished to detach the Baltic Provinces, he forgets to tell the reader sufficiently clearly that their detachment was in itself necessary and wise. What precise regime the Germans were to establish in those provinces, time was never to reveal owing to the German defeat. Beyond doubt it would have been one a great deal too closely dependent on Germany. I am not concerned to deny that, but I am concerned to argue that, intolerable as it would have been that the Baltic provinces should have been under Germany, it would have been yet more intolerable that they should have remained under the Bolsheviks. And under the Bolsheviks they well might have remained had it not been for the accident of Brest-Litovsk. The Germans had no intention of being liberators, but they were liberators *malgré eux*. Happy is he who is rescued and whose liberator then perishes at the moment of rescue!

Again, as Mr. Wheeler-Bennett very clearly brings out, the German motives for supporting the Ukrainian separatists were purely cynical, if cynical be the right word. They clearly cared nothing whether the Ukrainians wished to be free of Moscow or not. But nevertheless there is a good deal of reason to think that as a matter of fact the Ukrainians did wish to be free of Moscow. If they could have had a free vote, they would certainly not have voted Skoropadsky and the Germans in but it is probable that they would have voted the Bolsheviks out.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett does not bring out that, at the Armistice, we insisted on the German troops staying in the Ukraine until we were ready to supplant them. Our hope was thus to keep the Bolsheviks out. They did not in fact stay because they melted away in demoralisation, but Mr. Churchill has an eloquent passage—which to-day makes interesting reading—on the Germans as the one civilising force in that part of the world.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett is content with his excellent narrative and does not stop to read us lectures by the wayside. Nevertheless it seems clear that he is in sympathy with Mr. Bruce-Lockhart's advocacy of support of the Bolsheviks against the Germans and thinks that the Allied statesmen showed lack of imagination in not giving that support. But, wherever the balance of the argument may have lain, surely there were two very strong objections to that policy, which he does not quite clearly bring out. First, the purely practical; for obvious geographical reasons it would have taken much longer to move Allied troops to the Russo-German front than to move German troops there. Challenging the Germans there, should we not have been challenging them on a field where they would be at a great advantage over us? Of course, if a handful of Allied troops and supplies could have called into life an efficient Bolshevik army, it might have been worth doing. But would it have done so? Lenin who, if anybody, should have known, at any rate did not seem to think so. Secondly, just as the Germans discovered, just as the Allies themselves discovered after the Armistice, in the war-weariness of 1918, it was extremely dangerous to allow one's troops to come into any sort of contact with the Bolshe-

viks. Had Allied troops gone to Russia, it was the confessed intention of the Bolsheviks to use them for their own purposes twice over—first, by getting them to fight Bolshevik battles in Russia, and then by sending them home impregnated with revolutionary propaganda. Was it not as wise to keep clear of such dangers—especially when it was possible to win the war without them?

Of course we did not keep clear of them after the Armistice, but that is another story, with which neither Mr. Wheeler-Bennett nor I are concerned in this particular argument.

MADAME TABOUIS EXPLAINS

PERFIDIOUS ALBION—ENTENTE CORDIALE. By Geneviève Tabouis. *Thornton Butterworth.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by SIR ORME CLARKE

MADAME TABOUIS is a journalist and not a historian, and has written her book for the enlightenment of her own countrymen rather than for British readers. In reading her book these two facts should be borne in mind.

The accusation contained in the words "*Perfide Albion*" is one which has seldom been absent from French minds and Madame Tabouis has set herself the task of explaining how the differences of mental outlook and political interests between the French and the British have given rise to the accusation and how a greater insight into these differences would have enabled the French to realise that, when apparently acting perfidiously, Great Britain was merely obeying certain instincts and principles of policy without any intention of betrayal. With this laudable end in view Madame Tabouis has produced a book in which British and French relations are traced from the days of the Conquest down to the present

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NELSON'S DISCUSSION BOOKS

time and comments are made to assist the French mind to understand that actions that have been looked upon as perfidious could have been foreseen and were explicable without reference to treachery.

So wide a field is covered by the book that the earlier historical part is necessarily sketchy; and, in fact, is not always accurate. But it is not this part of the book which will most interest British readers; they will turn more readily to the later pages, where the events of the last twenty-five years are dealt with and the results during the war and post-war period of the differences of character and outlook of the two countries are analysed.

To those who have any knowledge of British and French relations it is a commonplace to say that the French are a logical people who feel unhappy unless they can relate their actions to a preconceived idea, whereas the British are pragmatical and are alarmed by a general idea, if indeed they are capable of forming one. Madame Tabouis' book shows how true this is of the French. She has taken a few general ideas and has to some extent fitted her history to them. According to her the French are idealists, the British materialists. Incidentally it would be entertaining to hear the shades of Lord Lyons and Lord Snowden discussing the proposition. Can it be that ideal and *idéal* are *de faux amis*? The British are said to be obsessed by the doctrine of balance of power in Europe, the French by the desire for security. France was not to become too predominant in Europe, hence the British objection to the Rhine as a frontier. The British wished to see an early resumption of normal trade, while the French were concerned with carrying out the letter of the treaty.

It is to these differences that Madame Tabouis ascribes the friction between the two countries and the ineffectiveness of their policy since the war.

It is doubtful whether this diagnosis will wholly satisfy British minds. It does not lay sufficient stress on the fundamental differences as regards the future of Germany. The French hoped that the result of the war would be to leave a permanently enfeebled Germany and a powerful France secure within her new frontiers. The British realised, perhaps dimly and tentatively, that a great nation could not be kept in a position of inferiority for ever and that it was not wise to impose and insist upon conditions that must seem intolerable to the Germans. Allied post-war policy fell between these two stools, neither party to the Entente being able or willing to impose its view upon the other.

Madame Tabouis says with truth that "a complete Entente between the two peoples has never existed," but her book certainly helps to make the two peoples understand one another better and as such is a valuable contribution to the *solidarité* of the two greatest democratic nations of Europe.

The translation is adequate, but at times awkward and obscure, though the obscurity is probably due to the original French. There is no index, a regrettable omission.

MURDER MAKES HISTORY

ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA, The Strong Man of the Balkans. By Stephen Graham. *Cassell.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by Douglas Reed

An excellent book, full of labour and deep research, and enthralling to read.

You could tell the tale of our contemporary times by beading, on a scarlet thread, the long series of murders from Sarajevo to Marseilles. Of those many political crimes the most dramatic, and the most illuminating to study, is that murder in Marseilles. All the dark corners

of European politics are lit, as you read, and you may well be staggered by the things that States may do, unreproved, in the name of patriotism.

A Bulgarian gunman, hired by Croat terrorists financed and harboured by Italy, encouraged by Hungary, and not all too closely watched by Austria! What writer could conceive so fantastic a plot? And even assuming so many improbable (but true) things, who could imagine that the common enemy, the King of Yugoslavia, would be given by his allies in Marseilles a slow and ramshackle old open motor-car with a running-board all ready for the assassin, or that a man of criminal appearance, his pockets bulging with pistols and bombs, could just run forward, jump on and shoot Alexander, almost without anybody noticing what had happened?

The subject is of inexhaustible interest, and anybody who has any concern with politics should read Mr. Graham's book, for the whole dark background of contemporary Europe is in this murder.

Mr. Graham has mastered all the facts, studied the evidence at the almost farcical trials of the assassin's accomplices, spoken with the foremost survivors. He weaves into his tale, dominated by the figures of the King, the Macedonian gunman, the Croat terrorist leader, and the Italian dictator, a concise political study of Yugoslavia. The account of the murder curdles the blood again, after four years, by its revelation of the incredible confusion that prevailed at Marseilles. The rebuff to the Yugoslav offer of detectives; the lack of precautions; the scuffle of photographers to take the dead King's picture; the handkerchief tied round Barthou's arm below the burst artery; seldom was so inexplicable a chapter of misfortunes, well calculated to make many Serbs suspect even darker things than this book reveals.

Much of Mr. Graham's narrative of the murder comes direct from Boshko Yeftitch, the Foreign Minister who accompanied Alexander. I have seldom read anything more dramatic, in truth or fiction, than the account of the doomed King sitting with Yeftitch in the cabin of the one Yugoslav destroyer *Dubrovnik,* bound for Marseilles, and listening to Mussolini's voice, on the radio, saying: "We do not see much prospect of improving our relationships with Yugoslavia. . . . Nevertheless, we who are confident and strong now demand, for the last time, the possibility of an understanding."

At that moment the gunmen, come from the camp in Italy, were already in France, waiting for the King. A few weeks before, Dollfuss had been killed, and Alexander also heard Mussolini say: "We will defend with all our power the independence of the Austrian Republic, an independence now consecrated by the blood of a Chancellor, a little man but with great spirit."

A few hours later, the murder. A few years later, the annexation of Austria, the Italo-German exchange of congratulatory telegrams.

Italy and Yugoslavia now enjoy excellent relations.

One thing in Mr. Graham's book puzzles me, and a most important thing. He says Alexander's plan, when he went to France, was to recognise Soviet Russia, bring all three Little Entente States—not only Czechoslovakia, as subsequently happened—into an alliance with France and Russia and thus preserve the peace of Europe.

If that is so, his murder possibly altered the whole course of our times. But I have heard that the opposite is the truth; that Alexander had already foreseen the feebleness of France and England, the collapse of the collective-security ideal, the rebirth of German might, and had decided that in these circumstances the iron-ring theory was too insecure for him. that he would cultivate good relations

with Germany, as his successors in Yugoslavia subsequently did. I wish I knew which is right.

But in any case, an excellent book.

GOEBBELS WITH A DIFFERENCE

PROPAGANDA IN THE NEXT WAR.

By Sidney Rogerson. *Geoffrey Bles.* 5*s.*

Reviewed by H. A. St. G. Saunders

I remember, when I was at Oxford, taking up an old play the title of which I forget. I fell on a stage direction which ran, "Enter Rumour, painted, full of tongues." Captain Rogerson shows how that personage is to be used, not as she was in that old play as the despicable instrument of confusion leading to misunderstanding, madness and prejudice, but as a weapon as powerful as the aeroplane, battleship or tank in the winning of the next war. His book is written crisply, forcibly and vividly, and as Captain Liddell Hart says in the preface, dissent from its interpretation of events ". . . does not make one less ready to appreciate its wealth of knowledge, power of exposition and the acuteness of so many of its psychological observations."

Captain Rogerson adopts as his thesis the two main points seized on by Lord Northcliffe in 1918. Propaganda must be truthful and it must always be linked to a definite policy. The whole of Captain Rogerson's book is, in effect, a description of how best to follow these principles. "Above all, never tell a lie if you can possibly help it, because in propaganda you are finished if you are convicted of untruthfulness."

The book is directed to urging this country to take as effective steps in advance in the propaganda field as she is taking in the field of armaments. Certainly the case Captain Rogerson makes out is very convincing. He pleads, above all, for a concrete aim, a constructive ideal. It is not necessary in this country as it is in Germany to force a doctrine upon a people. What must be done in Britain is not to await the hour of peril and hope that the good old British spirit may, as ever, be relied upon, but to touch that spirit now, use it and train it. The present situation is, as usual, confused, and Captain Rogerson's chapter on the home front makes sad reading. Assuming that the average Englishman is prepared to defend the spirit of England as much as the land of England, what is immediately essential is that he should be taught properly how to do it. Here our national character is a hindrance. The effort is dispersed: there is an utter lack of concentration and co-ordination: there is no carefully thought out plan of campaign: if, indeed, a commercial firm conducted its advertising in the way the public authorities are handling their defence propaganda, the chance of successfully selling its goods would, in Captain Rogerson's view, be almost nil. Captain Rogerson's remedies are drastic and may be, by some, called provocative. Granted, however, that propaganda is necessary, they seem to him to be inescapable. He suggests, first, that the Government should establish a Central Co-ordinating Council upon which should serve representatives of the newspapers, the film industry, the B.B.C., the rediffusion interests, the British Council and the press officers of the various Government departments. This Council should be presided over by a well-known man and he puts forward the name of Lord Tweedsmuir.

His second suggestion is that an independent body should be set up in order to exploit the existing good-will in an attempt to mould public opinion along the lines of a return to the patriotic

virtues and a sense of the realities of our position as a nation.

Six, or even three months ago, such a doctrine might have been denounced as anti-democratic, anti-English, wholly abhorrent. But with Dr. Goebbels announcing that "Germany is advancing with the sword in one hand and *Mein Kampf* in another," who will take the responsibility of maintaining that it is not perhaps the most effective means of safeguarding that democratic liberty which, in the last resort, is the only thing worth living or dying for?

WITH BLINKERS THROUGH GERMANY

I MARRIED A GERMAN. By Madeleine Kent. *Allen & Unwin.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by ALISON OUTHWAITE

THE first part of this account by an English University woman of her life married to a German Socialist aims apparently at showing how repellent, even in pre-Nazi days, the Germans were; and only succeeds in exposing a lack of sympathy in her own nature. Most of her anecdotes create an opposite impression to that she intends. A kindly milkman, who was distressed that, as a newcomer speaking little German, she had few friends, announced that he had found her another Englishwoman whom he had asked to call; she was "a little taken aback at his officiousness" and has no word of appreciation for a friendly thought. A harmless practical joke played by a Sudeten German on a Czech Customs official is recounted as "typical cunning"; while a poor peasant family's habit of consuming a large cake on Sundays, after living on curds and potatoes all the week, is instanced to show their "greed."

More serious is the writer's failure to give the clue to Hitler's success in 1933. Owing to a fundamental unwillingness to acknowledge their system a rank failure in that country, most Socialist writers on Germany leave the reader completely at sea. One is reminded of the remark attributed to Hegel: "If the facts don't agree with my theories, all the worse for the facts." The impression given is that Hitler swept into power simply by bludgeoning Socialists and Communists, by lack of courage on the part of the Left leaders, and of integrity on the part of the Nationalist opposition. These factors certainly played a part; but the "betrayal of the masses" is largely a myth, since the masses—a great proportion of them—had gone voluntarily over to the enemy. And for a good reason, that the country was in ruin, with 6,000,000 men in a state of desperation through unemployment. Moreover, these unemployed were Germans, to whom work, even for work's sake, was all-important. Hitler promised work, and has fulfilled his promise, and writers who depict the German scene omitting or glossing over this essential point are biassed historians whose accounts are of small value.

Mrs. Kent reveals a typical fault of the intellectual, man or woman, who has never faced actual hunger for himself and his family, that of assuming that the things of the spirit always do count above things of the flesh, just because in theory they should. She describes a not uncommon pre-Hitler episode. One evening she and her husband noticed a pale, thin, shabby young man, with the face of a scholar, rummaging through a litter basket. It was impossible, she recounts, not to hurry after him and offer him the price of a supper.

> '"What made you hunt through the basket?" asked Hans, more for something friendly to say than because he did not already know. "Hunger," came the laconic response, spoken with a kind of angry shame. It was as though he, who in his extremity could see in a drooping flower something worth cherishing, despised himself for need-

ing food. We did not presume to pity him. He was, after all, so much richer than the Storm Trooper strutting up and down the next street.'

The bewilderment of any reader searching for a clue to Hitler's power must be only increased on finding him dismissed with the phrase: "Hitler, the lower-middle-class snob who has wrecked a democracy to escape the indignity of having to join a Trade Union." Nearly as good is the double-barrelled shot which the author fires at a bit of the British Empire and Saxony: "The land now called Saxony was originally a sort of Australia, colonised by the ne'er-do-wells from other parts of the country."

Nevertheless, in the section dealing with life in the early Hitler days, Mrs. Kent's book has value as a truthful eye-witness's account of brutalities and stupidities which revolt even the most faithful friend of the German people. And throughout it is extremely well written. In some places she puts her finger firmly on the spot:

> 'In the patriotism of the Germans there is a curiously unreliable streak, half materialistic, half romantic. Unless they are continually reassured that their nation is the biggest, the richest, the most cultured, they are liable to transfer their allegiance elsewhere.'

Extremely true—hence the, to our eyes wildly exaggerated, patriotic propaganda carried on by the Nazis.

"THE ARYAN PATH"

The Aryan Path January issue is devoted to the problem of peace, and contains an extremely interesting symposium of thought on the subject. Among the articles, eighteen in all, contributed by outstanding writers are: "The Foundation of European Peace," by Sir Norman Angell; "Industrialisation: Violence is Necessary to It." by J. C. Kumarappa; "Race Prejudice and War," by Lord Olivier, and one on Hinduism and Non-Violence by P. Mahadevan.

TRAVEL NOTES

IN FRENCH MOROCCO

French Morocco deserves the attention of tourists in search of the sun this year. This is what no less an authority than Mr. Winston Churchill said of it, in the *Daily Mail*:

"Here we have a region larger than England, gifted with a rich and fertile soil, an adequate rainfall, and a climate which in spite of four hot months is admirably fitted for European residents and settlers. . . .

"The French act with something of the assurance which distinguished the builders of our Indian Empire in bygone times. They have a purpose and are not at all ashamed of it. Their purpose is not to hand over the country to its inhabitants, but on the contrary to develop it with the utmost energy for the enrichment of all classes in Morocco, and the important indirect advantage of France. . . .

"Splendid roads, upon which great numbers of Moroccans find employment, trellis the country from end to end. Far into the mountains wind these roads, enabling the motor-car to penetrate in a day where a few years ago a caravan would have required a fortnight. Everywhere excellent accommodation is provided for the traveller. The hotels at Rabat, Casablanca, Safi, Agadir, Meknès and Marrakech, not to mention many other places, are of the highest order. They outclass the best hotels in Cairo, or in other places in Egypt. Thought, organisation, and will-power have been lavished upon creating a first-class tourist structure. . . .

"I must confess myself captivated by Marrakech. Here in these spacious palm groves rising from the desert the traveller can be sure of perennial sunshine, of every comfort and diversion, and can contemplate with ceaseless satisfaction the stately snow-clad panorama of the Atlas Mountains. The sun is brilliant and warm, but not scorching; the air crisp, bracing, but without being chilly; the days bright, the nights cool and fresh.

"The Arab inhabitants are a perpetual attraction with their flowing, many-coloured robes. Every peasant is a picture, every crowd a pageant.

THE GARDEN OF OUDAIAS AT RABAT

"If winter sunshine is the quest, here is its achievement. Thus far all smiles. Is there a darker underside? The Moors are a proud and ancient race—till only yesterday a race of conquerors. Are they tamed? Are they reconciled to this new civilisation with its order, its efficiency, its many benefits, its proofs of active progress and its sense of effort? Or are they dreaming of the days of Moorish greatness?"

A 40 per cent reduction is granted by the French Railways for transit across France and 35 per cent by Steamship lines between Bordeaux (French Line) or Marseilles (Cie Paquet) and Casablanca for people booking inclusive tours in Morocco through any recognised Tourist Agency. There is also a daily air service from London to Casablanca by Air France.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

NEW YEAR PROSPECTS

by "RAPIER"

Hopes of further appeasement from Mr. Chamberlain's forthcoming visit to Rome and from the signing of the Franco-German peace pact have been grievously weakened by the bitter attacks upon France in the Italian press and by the continuance of a concurrent press campaign against Britain in the German press. At the same time the German press has been friendly towards France and the Italian press similarly so towards Britain. These contradictory revolutions of the Rome-Berlin axis have thrown the rest of Europe out of gear and suspended any revival of confidence in the prospects of the smooth functioning of the European body politic as a whole.

As a consequence, market activity has been reduced to a minimum and business generally maintained on a hand-to-mouth basis except for an increased tempo in the international armaments race. The foreign exchange market alone in such conditions is the really active feature, reflecting the hopes and fears of international capitalists, giving speculators the only outlet for their gambling propensities, and acting as an insurance market for those traders who must cover their legitimate risks by forward contracts in foreign currencies. The unfortunate investor who seeks in such conditions to safeguard his life savings and to ensure a regular income with stable purchasing power for his old age, is sorely harassed and perplexed. Nor is the industrialist or merchant in any better position to take a view of the future and enter into long-term contracts for the wares he produces or markets. Added to these disabilities the trader has to contend with autarchic systems limiting to a greater or lesser degree the free flow of international trade, ranging from barbaric barter to the but little less restrictive refinements of blocked currencies, tariffs, quotas and subsidies. At the same time international loans and credits, which are the life-blood of international trade, are restricted by the credit-unworthiness of borrowers who through wholesale or partial default on their existing obligations have become anathema to their creditors. Finally, all over the world the patient taxpayer is subjected to penal taxation to pay for the unproductive stream of armaments which flows at an ever-increasing rate from the arsenals of the Great Powers, and which is either in course of destroying life and property as in Spain and China, or is menacing similar destruction in other parts of the world.

Such is the economic picture which confronts the world at the opening of the year 1939, or such is its debit side. What amelioration can we find on the credit side of the account? In the currency field the Tripartite Agreement still functions, albeit somewhat lamely with the French franc uneasily poised 'twixt freedom and control. But at least this gives the three great democracies, together with their

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satellites, a more or less stable currency linked through the United States to a flexible gold standard. This provides a *point d'appui* in the shifting sands of world currencies and—to change the metaphor—a club to which new members are always welcome should they agree to abide by its rules. Then there is the Anglo-American trade treaty which becomes operative in January and which is a considerable step towards freeing the bonds of trade not only between the United States and the British Empire, but also, by its most-favoured-nation provisions, with all those countries which have trade treaties with the principals concerned. Even though the necessity for placating vested interests has limited the scope of this treaty, it has at least modified the exclusiveness of the Ottawa agreements and, we may hope, has laid the foundations for further extensions as time goes on.

Britain v. Germany

Even with regard to Eastern Europe, however much we may deplore the break up of a democratic state and however we may dislike the methods employed by Germany in its foreign trade transactions, it may be argued that at least the area in which an interchange of goods of a kind takes place has been extended by recent events in Central Europe. Not that this exchange is by any means ideal for, as Ambassador Kennedy has pointed out, the amount of sick headaches in the Balkans is unequal to the export of aspirins which is tendered to these countries in exchange for their wheat, hogs, oil and other natural products.

This leads us to the dilemma of how Britain should answer the methods of the totalitarian countries and endeavour to increase its own export trade. The Government has already introduced a bill to increase export credit facilities by £25,000,000 to £75,000,000 for ordinary trade purposes, and by another £10,000,000 for extraordinary trade where political considerations make it advisable to undertake such additional risks. This has been one of the most successful schemes formulated by the Government to extend exports, and, since 1926 when it was first introduced, the total value of contracts, policies and guarantees issued exceeds £180,000,000. Moreover these guarantees have imposed no charge upon the Exchequer as the premiums received have exceeded the total of claims paid and of administrative expenses. These measures will not be sufficient alone to restore our export trade and it may be necessary for industries to form bulk selling and buying agencies to supplement the efforts of individual traders. It is to be hoped that the Government will avoid as far as possible the method of subsidising exports as this is merely inviting retaliation from other countries. Nor should Britain

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emulate other trading practices of an even less savoury character adopted by totalitarian countries. Our market still offers the attraction of a free currency to sellers though we have limited its scope by tariffs and the various restrictive trading agreements made in recent years. It should be remembered that trade is not naturally bi-lateral but multi-lateral, and that bi-lateral trading agreements which attempt to balance imports with exports tend to reduce trade to a minimum.

One bright feature of the New Year is the prospect for continuing trade revival in the United States. The enormous purchasing power of this market has a predominant influence upon world trade and is especially important for the British Empire. Granted peace in Europe, there are, therefore, still prospects that 1939 may be a more prosperous year than 1938. But will there be peace?

DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: NOV. 17–DEC. 14

THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC

The international commission in Berlin confirmed (November 21st) further exchanges of territory, to which Czechoslovakia had assented, including the transfer to the Reich, on economic grounds, of certain Czech districts in south-west Bohemia and of lands adjoining Bratislava. The frontiers resulting from these adjustments were notified, for form's sake (November 24th), by Prague to all the four Powers whose guarantee against "unprovoked aggression" had been promised at Munich. Independent agreements between the two governments (November 19th) provided for the cession to the Reich of a corridor—40 miles by 60 yards—for the construction, at German cost, of a Breslau-Vienna motor-road, and for Czechoslovakia's participation, *pro rata,* in a Danube-Oder Canal. Another agreement (published November 23rd) provided that Germans resident in Bohemia, or Czechs in the Sudeten districts, excepting—in substance—settlers since the war, who remain liable to expulsion, might opt for German (or Czech) nationality. A joint declaration provided for the free development and activity of the respective minorities, and Herr Henlein, now *Gauleiter* of the Sudeten districts, in a speech about December 1st, promised full liberty for Czech schools and religious organisations. Dr. Hacha, elected President of the re-constituted "Czech-Slovak" Republic (November 19th) foretold, in an interview, "a very close relationship" between his country and the Reich.

In "Carpatho-Ukraine" frequent collisions occurred between the local gendarmerie and "free corps," coming from Poland and Hungary, whose governments, still hopeful of Italy's support, persisted, despite the Vienna award of November 2nd, in seeking a common frontier. An invasion in force appeared imminent in mid-November, but, after imperative warnings by the Reich in Budapest and Warsaw, accompanied, beyond doubt, in regard to Hungary, by advice from Rumania and Jugoslavia, these warlike symptoms abated. M. de Kanya, Hungarian Foreign Minister, resigned (November 28th); agreements supervened with Hungary for railway traffic and the cessation of expulsions.

POLAND AND MEMEL

Germany's apparent purpose of utilising Carpatho-Ukraine as a base for Ukrainian irredentism in Russia and Galicia, and of settling the Memel question independently of Warsaw, her veto on a joint Polish-Hungarian frontier, together with other disquieting signs, such as claims—reminiscent of the Karlsbad

"8 points"—submitted to Warsaw by the German minority in Teschen, led Poland to sign a "good neighbour" agreement with Russia (November 27th), confirming, *inter alia,* the non-aggression Pact of 1935, and to adopt (December 2nd) a three-year armament programme costing £170,000,000. This sudden re-orientation caused surprise in Berlin; the agreement would, as the Moscow *Izvestia* observed, preclude Poland's accession to the Anti-Comintern treaty. A bill for giving autonomy to Polish Ukrainians, introduced in the Sejm (December 9th) won approval in Berlin.

A similar sense of isolation led Lithuania, faced with imperious demands by the Nazi leaders in Memel, to implement, in part, the "normal relations" agreement imposed on her by Colonel Beck on July 1st last, to conclude a Press entente (November 22nd) with Poland, and even to dissolve (November 25th) the Vilna Association as a token of—at any rate temporary—appeasement.

In view of declarations by the leaders of the Memel Germans, prior to the elections for the Diet (December 11th) in which they were assured of a sweeping majority, that the vote would be a "plebiscite for return to the Reich," a *démarche* was made by the British and French ambassadors in Berlin (December 12th) deprecating any action inconsistent with the Memel Statute."

APPEASEMENT AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Owing largely to the methods of retaliation against the Jews in Germany after Herr v. Rath's murder in Paris (November 7th) and the consequent accentuation of the refugee problem, international tension so increased that Mr. Pirow, South African Defence Minister, returning from the Continent (December 5th) declared that Europe was "drifting into war."

In England not only was there disappointment, as Mr. Chamberlain admitted (December 7th), at the small response to his policy of appeasement, but opinion was "so deeply stirred by the plight of the Jewish refugees"—as Sir J. Simon declared (November 24th) that discussions with Germany became difficult. Condemnation of the excesses by British Ministers and public men aroused unrestrained attacks in the German Press, and counter-charges of atrocities in Palestine—which the Colonial Office contradicted (December 8th). A protest made in Berlin against the association, by the *Angriff* (November 8th), of British statesmen with Herr v. Rath's assassin obtained no satisfaction. These developments and the feeling expressed by Lord de la Warr (December 4th) that all friendly advances to Germany were regarded by her as cowardice, turned British—and French—opinion definitely against her African claims. Mr. Macdonald's statement in Parliament (December 7th) that the transfer of either colonies or mandates "was not now an issue of practical politics" aroused angry comment in the Reich.

With France, on the other hand, where reprobation of the anti-semitic measures was less vocal, negotiations were pressed on the Reich with a speed which neither M. Daladier's refusal (Nov. 17th) to cede any colonial possessions nor his Cabinet's unwillingness to restrict Press freedom was allowed to retard. On November 23rd a Declaration was announced and, after a delay due to the French strikes, it was signed in Paris (December 5th) by Herr v. Ribbentrop and M. Bonnet. The text repeated, once again, Herr Hitler's assurance that no territorial question was outstanding between the two countries, who recognised their existing frontiers as final, and agreed to consult on questions fraught with international difficulties. A separate statement reserved their special relations with third parties.

Between England and Italy the Anglo-Italian Pact was declared, in telegrams exchanged (November 17th) by Mr. Chamberlain and Il Duce, to have created a basis of co-operation. Lord Perth was accredited (November 16th) to the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Legation in London ceased to be recognised. Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax were invited (November 28th) to visit Rome in January. The

Italian Press, like that of Germany, differentiated—though in the inverse order—between England and France, showing restraint towards the former while constantly attacking the latter.

A first obstacle, in Italy's eyes, to appeasement with France was "French intervention in Spain," which Dr. Gayda described (November 15th) as threatening Italian communications in the Mediterranean. Italy had hoped that the British ministers desirous of a French-Italian accord would have induced France at the Paris meeting (see below) to agree, at least, to the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco. On November 30th a reference by Count Ciano in the Chamber to Italy's "natural aspirations" was greeted by the deputies with shouts of "Nice," "Corsica," "Tunis." A militant Press campaign followed, urging these demands as a logical development of the Munich principles. British opinion was represented—incorrectly—as sympathetic to Italy's aims. The German Press—though not till the Paris declaration was signed—supported Italy's aspirations for regions so "predominantly Italian."

French opinion, of all parties, rejected these pretensions *in toto*. M. François Poncet made a firm protest in Rome (December 2nd); Lord Perth (December 3rd) emphasised the ill-effects of such incidents on co-operation between the Munich Powers, and Mr. Chamberlain recalled in Parliament (December 5th) that Annex 1 of the Anglo-Italian Pact opposed alterations in the Mediterranean *status quo*. Count Ciano's reply was to dissociate his government from the demonstrations and to assure England that Italy would observe her undertakings. M. Daladier (December 5th), acknowledging loyal assurances from Corsica and Tunis, where there had been some anti-Italian manifestations, declared France's resolve to ensure respect for all her territory.

After Mr. Chamberlain's statement in Parliament on December 5th the Italian Press turned its attention from these territorial claims to Italy's right, as the second largest user of the Suez Canal, to a share in its administration; and to the Jibuti railway, controlled by France.

The conversations which Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had with the French ministers in Paris (November 23rd-25th) turned largely on the co-ordination of defence, in the event of an attack on either party, and the appropriate strengths of the respective land and air forces. No fresh commitments were assumed by the British government, but the discussions were reflected in its decision (December 1st) to establish a voluntary register and in France's efforts to increase aeroplane production.

UNITED STATES

With the United States, Germany's relations were severely strained owing, generally, to the recoil of American opinion from the Nazi political and economic methods and, particularly, to the treatment of the Jews and Catholics in Germany, whereat President Roosevelt declared himself (November 15th) "profoundly shocked." Mr. Wilson, American ambassador, was recalled, "to report," for an indefinite time, whereupon the Reich (November 18th) recalled Dr. Dieckhoff to report on the President's "strange attitude." Germany's rejection (November 17th) of liability to American holders of Austrian bonds led the United States (November 26th) to protest against "discrimination." The Anglo-American treaties of November 17th, though primarily commercial, were also politically significant as establishing a foundation for Anglo-American solidariay. The President's appeal (November 15th) for the "broadening and unifying of the Monroe doctrine" and Mr. Hull's statement at the Lima conference (December 9th) that the United States would arm to resist any invasions of the western hemisphere were resented in Berlin as attributing hostile design to Germany in South America.

SPAIN

After four months' fighting, at a cost of 40,000 men to each side, the Nationalists forced the Republicans (November 18th) to withdraw over the Ebro. In

December they began systematic air-bombardments of towns, a method of war against which the Barcelona Government (December 9th) besought England to use her influence. Dr. Negrin appealed (December 11th) for a fresh effort against an offensive which appeared to be threatening on the Catalonian front. About 13,000 foreign volunteers were reported (November 21st) to have been evacuated by the Republic; General Franco, convinced that a coastal blockade would bring the war to an end, was, however, still unwilling to accept the Non-Intervention Committee's plan for the withdrawal of volunteers till belligerent rights were granted. The French Government's view, with which the British ministers concurred at the Paris meeting (November 24th), was that the Committee's plan was the extreme limit of concession; at the same meeting Dr. Negrin's "12 points" of May 1st was discussed as a possible basis of peace. Meanwhile, as Nationalist warships were constantly challenging or diverting neutral vessels, the French Government decided (December 2nd) to station a destroyer near Gibraltar to assist French shipping; Great Britain, up to December 7th, had intervened in 14 cases, in support of neutral governments, to secure the release of ships.

Reports by League of Nations experts and the International Relief Committee (November 22nd) showed the food situation in Republican Spain to be very grave.

Sweden withdrew from the Non-Intervention Sub-Committee (November 29th). Belgium also withdrew from the Committee and accredited an agent to the Burgos government. The Republic, as a protest, withdrew its ambassador from Brussels (December 1st) and Belgium then recalled her representatives in Barcelona and Madrid.

PALESTINE

The international aspect of the Palestine problem, which had been recalled by the American State Department's declaration (October 14th) that any modification to the mandate would need United States assent, was again emphasised when the British government announced (November 25th) that representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan and Yemen had been invited to the conference convened in London to promote Arab-Jewish understanding; and that Great Britain would be bound, at the conference, by the mandate and by its obligations to the members of the League and to the United States.

THE FAR EAST

The Japanese Government's reply to the British and French protests against the closing of the Yangtse navigation, to the effect that the river was used only for military transport and could not be open for commerce, at present, was held by those governments (November 24th) to be unsatisfactory. To the United States note of October 6th Japan replied denying "discrimination" against Americans, and justifying present restrictions by exigencies of war.

Japanese military opinion regarded the taking of Hankow as a decisive stage, though guerilla operations might long continue; plans were now approved for combining the "New China," Japan and Manchukuo in a political-economic bloc, with the formation of which, as Prince Konoe indicated (December 1st), the "China incident" would be ended. Lord Plymouth declared (December 6th) that England could not subscribe to such unilateral alterations of treaty positions. He warned Japan of the "incalculable repercussions" of an exclusionist policy, and observed that England was considering plans for helping China with export credits. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, whom the British ambassador visited in November, showed no willingness for compromise on any terms that Japan was likely to offer. The troops he had sent to recapture Canton were reported (December 9th) to be well situated for an offensive. In northern Hunan he was resisting a fresh Japanese advance. South and west of Canton the Japanese troops were engaged in operations tending to isolate Hong-Kong and Macao from the mainland.

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